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1. Introduction   
 
 
Background 
 
World populations are on the move. For many centuries now all over the world  
demographic transformation has become an important issue with astonishing 
implications on the development of whole countries and regions.  
No matter which population trend a region faces, or which phase of the transition it 
passes, it will have to react as soon as it becomes evident that this will bring about 
negative consequences and vast changes in social, political and economic life.  
While most developing countries still face the problem of overpopulation and high 
fertility and mortality, the developed world has to cope with a new problem, the rapidly 
ageing population. Especially in Europe and North America this issue has a great 
variety of implications and has led to heated discussions and new plans how to react to 
the greying society. However, as countries in Asia are moving forward in terms of their 
development, they also seem to be facing new challenges related to the ageing 
phenomenon, frequently even more drastic than countries in Europe or North America.  
 
Purpose and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
In an effort to understand the process of the continuous demographic transformation and 
its implications this paper will investigate the historic demographic transition and recent 
population trends that are evolving in two Asian countries, China1 and Japan, by 
comparing their path of population development. This paper, due to length limitations, 
predominantly refers to the demographic transformation in general using overall data. 
One however has to keep in mind that this generalisation may not depict the differences 
that still exist between different regions and between rural and urban areas due to the 
varying extent of development and modernization, especially in the PRC.  
 
Regional demographic differences have become more pronounced in China as economic stratification 
deepens following the reform. Differences between urban and rural areas between rich and poor 
provinces portray a demogprahic profile that resembles the whole world.2 
                                                
1 Note: China as used in this work refers to the the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the listing of the     
countries  derives from their alphabetical order of their first letter.  
2 Brandt 2008: p.160 
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To analyse various regions in details would however exceed the scope of this thesis,  
therefore one has to draw overall assumptions as different regions may still lag behind 
in an earlier stage compared to the whole country.  
The study has the objective to analyze the demographic evolution and study the 
consequences that will accompany it by first developing the theoretical framework and 
by then investigating the differences and similarities in the demographic development in 
the two countries studied. The focus will lie on their process of transition and their 
reaction to the current situation that they are in and a future where ageing will become a 
core problem of society.  
	  	  
Therefore, the main research questions that will be essential in this study will be:  
	  
 (1) How the demographic transition occurred in Japan and China and where similarities 
and differences can be distinguished and (2) Whether traditional values will remain 
important enough, offering means to mitigate the problematic situation of a rapidly 
ageing society and if the government will be able to offer a sufficiently strong social 
security network.  
 
It is of utmost importance to keep these questions in mind when trying to find out more 
about the process of demographic transformation that evolved over the decades and 
whether and how these two countries will be able to cope with the new situation and 
with the high pressure that will be exerted on society and the state.  
 
Structure of the Thesis  
 
After an introduction to the topic this paper as a first step will analyse the demographic 
transition of both states taking the main factors of demographic change — mortality and 
fertility — into account. Political and economic influences on the development of a 
population can be astonishing and may evolve as a trigger for different trends within a 
society. Both the recognizable changes as well as their underlying causes shall be 
compared. This is vital for a more detailed analysis as China and Japan are two 
countries that have experienced fundamental changes in their population structure over 
the past decades, frequently varying in time and magnitude.  
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After examining the recent population trends and comparing them to one another China 
and Japan will be analysed with reference to the ageing phenomenon. Many countries 
all over the world today already have different approaches to coping with the ageing 
societies. How will East Asia react? Will China and Japan step up to the new 
demographic challenges and offer a different approach towards these changes? For 
many years they relied on their traditional values in relation to family, ageing and care; 
now however, partially influenced by special population planning programmes and the 
permeating characteristics of economic growth and modern lifestyles, the situation is 
subject to change.  
In the last section of this analysis the presence of traditional values in China and Japan 
and these two countries’ demographic response to modernization and to new challenges 
arising as a consequence of demographic transition and ageing will be compared. It is 
claimed that a restoration of traditional values could assist the alleviation of the 
consequences of rapid ageing. Even though today no one can exactly predict how 
changes will commence, but still it is vital to take a look at the past and start analysing 
the possible outcome in order to react appropriately and in time.  
 
Methods and Analytic Approach  
 
In order to analyze the demographic transition in China and Japan it is first of all 
necessary to offer a basic overview on the theoretical framework that will be used. The 
information will be based on available literature on demography and demographic 
theories.  
The main analytic part of this thesis will be a comparative analysis of demographic 
characteristics, historical developments, results and future trends by using various 
subject-relevant sources. For the comparative country overview and the projections on 
future trends statistical data from national census and from international organisations 
that are compiling data from various reliable sources will be used.  
 
Although statistics will be chosen thoroughly it has to be said that especially in the case 
of China reliable sources of pre-modern statistical data are rare. One has to be aware 
when handling statistics that false or underreporting and sample bias can influence the 
data quality. This however has been questioned before usage. Even though data quality 
may be inconsistent they may be used to depict long-run trends. 
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In general the most reliable sources such as the national census from the national 
bureaus of statistics and the data that is compiled on a regular basis by the UN 
Population Division will be used which are generally seen as fairly reliable sources. The 
UN collects data on the basis of vital registers, censuses and surveys carried out by 
various institutions.  
Being aware of the fact that official demographic statistics are frequently affected by 
incompleteness the Population Division tries to carry out analysis to remove these 
deficiencies to be able to calculate a population trend by use of the cohort-component 
method.   
 
World Population Prospects presents estimates for 230 countries and areas. About half of those 
countries or areas do not report official demographic statistics with the detail necessary for the 
preparation of cohort-component population projections. The Population Division undertakes its 
estimation work in order to close those gaps. The availability of data gathered by major survey 
programmes, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys or the Multiple-Indicator Cluster Surveys, 
are useful in generating some of the data that is not currently being produced by official statistics.3 
 
In China the first national census was carried out in 1953 by the State Statistical Bureau. 
During this time the quality of the data was influenced by underdeveloped research 
methods and political constellations. In 1984 the National Statistics Law4 was 
introduced which since then regulates the collection of data and tries to reduce political 
interference.  In retrospect the censuses for the year 1953 and 1964 were revised making 
the rough reconstruction of demographic history possible. Since the 1982 census the 
data published by the National Bureau of Statistics is seen as reliable.5  
In Japan the statistical system already evolved in 1869. Since then population and 
economic data was collected by several institutes and ministries. A modern statistical 
survey system has been in place since 1971 when the Office of Statistics was 
introduced. Since 1920 the censuses have been conducted every 5 years and are 
generally seen as very reliable source.  
                                                
3 UN Population Revision 2008 
4 cf. National Bureau of Statistics of China 1983 
5 cf. Banister 1991: p.12 et sequ.  
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2. Demography  
 
 
Demography is the scientific study of human population, its structure, size, 
composition, distribution and dynamics.6 The main factors influencing the already 
mentioned composition of a country’s population are mortality, fertility and migration, 
which can be further subdivided into special research fields such as age specific or sex 
specific rates. These have been analysed for many centuries in order to monitor the 
development of the population as a whole as well as different groups in relation to 
economic, social and political changes. 
 
2.1 The Demographic Transition  
 
Over the centuries, world demography has changed dramatically and a so-called 
demographic transition has taken place, the basic idea of which having been already 
introduced by the American demographer Warren Thompson (1887-1973) in 1929 who 
interpreted 200 years of demographic history.7 The theory was refined by further 
demographers such as Adolphe Landry, Frank W. Notestein and A.M. Carr-Saunders. 
Today we refer to it as the Demographic Transition Model or Theory8:  
 
Demographic transition is the most important theoretical idea in social demography […] the classical 
theory states that both the mortality and the fertility of a population will decline from high to low 
levels as a result of socio-economic development.9 Its major contribution is its utility less as a 
predictor than as a general description of population change.10 
 
The classic theory of demographic change originating from ideas by W. Thompson is 
based on a four-stage-model from the pre-industrialized to an industrialized society,11 
whereas in the past years further stages have been added to adapt to the changing 
circumstances.  
 
 
                                                
6  cf. Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.3 
7  cf. Singh 1998: p.67  
8  cf. Dudler 1996: p.361 et sequ. 
9  Beaver in Peng 1991: p.4  
10 Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.273 
11 cf. Chesnais 1992: p.1 
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Stage 1 - High stationary stage 
 
In the first or pre-transitional phase, which lasts many thousand years, the population is 
seen as being in a pre-industrial stage marked by high death and birth rates that fluctuate 
in accordance with natural catastrophes, diseases, food availability or wars.12 The high 
death rate derives mainly from non-existence or lack of hygiene, sanitation and medical 
care. The high birth rate is directly linked to the high infant mortality rate and the need 
to produce offspring to help in the household, to work on the family’s farmland or in the 
informal sector. 13 14 
 
Stage 2 – Early expanding stage  
 
This first transitional stage or early expanding stage is marked by a fall in mortality. 
The sudden decline in the death rate is influenced by many factors, the most important 
being the improvement of health care and sanitation.15 
Particularly changes in infant care reduce mortality drastically. The availability of clean 
water, sewage systems and certain standards related to food processing also has a 
positive impact on life expectancy. Furthermore, the ability to augment the food supply 
with the help of more efficient farming methods and new technologies contribute to the 
mortality reduction.16 
In this context the population theory by Thomas Malthus may explain the growing 
population as he believed that the growth of the food supply can be linked directly to 
the growth of the population. Malthus stated that a linear growth of food supply results 
in exponential population growth.17  
Besides the strong population growth due to reduced mortality, an age structure 
transition can be identified. As in this phase most of the deaths in the first stage used to 
be among children, the proportion of the population aged 0-10 years suddenly rises in 
the second stage. While growing older, more and more of the young survive and enter 
the reproductive cycle, thus maintaining the high fertility rate. The overall population 
grows rapidly, especially the lower part of the age pyramid.  
                                                
12 cf. Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.271 
13 cf. Sinha / Zacharia 2009: p.283 et sequ. 
14 cf. Leisinger / Schmitt 1994: p.100 
15 cf. Sinha / Zacharia 2009: p.284 et sequ. 
16 cf. Leisinger / Schmitt 1994: p.58 
17 cf. Malthus 1798 
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Stage 3 – Late expanding stage 
 
The main change in the late expanding stage is the fertility reduction. Following the 
declining death rate, the birth rate starts to fall with a time lag. Factors contributing to 
this process are:  
 
- Newly introduced contraceptives allowing the parents more freedom in 
family planning  
- Higher education made available for women who later may take on 
formal employment 
- Parents recognising the reduction in the child mortality and thus 
adjusting the number of children they have accordingly 
- Rising costs for children decreasing the wish for more children  
- Laws introduced forbidding child labour    
 
The results are clear — the previously large proportion of youth declines while people 
continue to age, leading to a reduction in the dependency ratio.18 
 
Stage 4 – Declining or post-industrial stage 
 
When birth and death rate are both low and remain constant; the fourth or post-
industrial stage is reached. The population is stable but at a high developmental level, 
allowing a country or region to move towards an advanced industrialized economic 
system. The demographic transition from the pre-industrialized stage to the stage of a 
highly industrialized country may lead to further growth and development.19  
 
 
                                                
18 cf. Leisinger / Schmitt 1994: p.102 
19 cf. Sinha / Zacharia 2009: p.285 et sequ. 
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Stage 5  
 
The fifth stage was originally not part of the transition model introduced in 1929, 
however, rapid changes make further developments in terms of population inevitable. 
This stage was introduced when countries began to move towards a total fertility rate 
(TFR) below the replacement rate while the life expectancy continued to rise.20 Ageing 
and a continuous population decline is the consequence of this shift.21 
 
 
 Demographic Transition Model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Demographic transition theory (including stage 5) 
 
                                                
20 cf. Blake 1947: p.97 et sequ. 
21 cf. Mirkin / Weinberger 2002: p.43 et sequ. 
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2.2  Transformation in the 19th and 20th Centuries  
 
The world experienced a vital transformation of its population in the 19th and 20th 
centuries.  
 
Never in human history has so wide a range of demographic situations prevailed in different parts of 
the world as at present, with population decline imminent in many countries, exponential growth still 
in prospect in many others, and most countries laced somewhere in between.22 
 
In many industrialized countries, especially in the West as well as in a few more 
developed countries in the East, the population structure and composition faced a 
continuous change. Several factors including positive economic developments in many 
regions, improvements in health care and hygiene and advancements in food production 
methods led to previously unknown high growth rates. 
While in Europe and North America this demographic transformation started quite 
early, in less developed countries the process commenced with a time lag. According to 
the Demographic Transition Theory, the transition from a pre-industrial to an 
industrialized economic system and therefore from a pre-industrial to an industrialized 
society, roughly follows the 4 stages earlier mentioned. 
Most of the industrialized Western countries already reached stage 3 and 4 by the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. In the East, some countries especially those with a more 
western lifestyle, experienced changes in their demography comparable to Western 
states, while poorer, less developed countries (LDCs) were and often still are stuck in 
stage 2 or early stage 3.23 The transition of LDCs characteristically occurs later but also 
at a higher speed. This, is however, only a rough generalization of a country`s 
population development path as frequently special circumstances lead to deviations 
from the stage model.  
In the middle of the 20th century governments and various organisations all over the 
world began to examine the consequences of these transition changes. Many introduced 
population planning programmes to control the ongoing developments. Thereby they 
tried to regulate the composition, size and distribution of their countries` populations. 
These initiatives were mainly “legislative measures, administrative programmes, and 
                                                
22 Jones 1997: p.2 
23 cf. Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.273 
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other governmental actions intended to alter or modify existing population trends in the 
interest of national survival and welfare.” 24  
At that time these regulations seemed necessary to enable and maintain modernization 
without throwbacks that could result from an extensive population growth. “Individuals 
and governments swung to view that small families were a good thing and that 
contraception not only was not obnoxious but on balance was the path of moral and 
responsible behaviour.” 25 
Starting in the 1960s several countries in the East began to abandon their pronatalist 
stance and introduced a number of programmes and policies with the intention to 
stabilize the country’s population growth and thereby remove barriers to economic 
growth.26 East Asia at that time was regarded as a very good example for the adoption 
of population policies and other regulating methods as several countries achieved vast 
changes within a relatively short period compared to other regions, whether 
underdeveloped or already industrialized.  
 
Within three decades, 1960-90, they were transformed from an economic backwater to the most 
dynamic region in the world economy. Countries that were impoverished in 1960 joined the ranks 
and, in some respects, surpassed the high-income countries of the West.27 
 
The greatest shifts emerged in Japan and China, whose population transformation was 
and still is partially influenced by its population policies and its economic development 
at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. These two countries were very 
eager to reach certain goals within a short timeframe and did not shy away from using 
strict policies, laws and other mechanisms to reach these. 
In the following chapters, the population planning methods and policies and the 
influence of economic growth on the society will be examined and compared in the case 
of China and Japan to evaluate the magnitude of their influence on population 
developments in these two East Asian countries.  
 
                                                
24 Eldridge in Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.338 
25 Jones 1997: p. 21  
26 cf. Mason 2001: p.5 
27 cf. Mason 2001: p.5  
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2.2.1 Population policies in the People’s Republic of China  
 
 
For a long time the dominating belief in many countries in East Asia was that a rising 
population would result in a strong workforce and therefore lead to high production and 
rapid economic growth. Abortions were forbidden and birth control was classified as 
murder. Especially in China this belief was supported in the late 19th and early 20th 
century while in Japan this notion was already weakening during that time.28 A 
rethinking slowly occurred in the mid 20th century when one started to sympathise with 
the ideas put forward by Thomas Robert Malthus. 
 
No limits whatever placed to the production of the earth; they may increase forever and be greater 
than any assignable quantity, yet still the power of population being a power of a superior order, the 
increase of the human species can only be kept commensurate to the increase of the means of 
subsistence by the constant operation of the strong law of necessity acting as a check upon the greater 
power.29  
 
As previously mentioned, Malthus believed that in the future populations would start 
growing more rapidly than the world-wide food supply, leading to stagnation, 
recessions and social grievances. 
In China it took longer to cast off its pronatalist attitude as in 1949, when the 
Communist Party of China (CCP) founded the People’s Republic of China, Mao 
Zedong was still of the opinion that “even if China’s population multiplies many times, 
she is fully capable of finding a solution, the solution is production.” 30  
He saw every member of society as a precious gift and did not listen to early Chinese 
demographers such as Ma Yinchu who already advocated a “New population theory” 
which pointed out that fertility control was a necessary means of supporting China’s 
development. “Ma’s report was [...] a direct assault on one of the most cherished beliefs 
of the country’s leader.” 31 
Apart from this fact, China was far more involved in rebuilding the national economy 
and showed little interest in population developments.   
It was only when the results of the first census in 1953 showed its extreme population 
growth that Mao Zedong slowly began to change his attitude towards population 
planning.32  
                                                
28 cf. Pearce 2010: chapter 9 
29 Malthus 1798: p.8 
30 Mao in Peng 1991: p.17  
31 Pearce 2010: p.289 
32 cf. Orleans 1957: p.567 
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One of the catalysts was the sudden reduction of the mortality rate due to improvements 
in the area of health care, hygiene and food supplies under Mao’s leadership. 
Campaigns were launched to improve the overall health and living standard of the 
Chinese population and within a decade the mortality rate was nearly halved.33    
(see figure 2)  
 
China: Death Rate  (1950-1975) 
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Figure 2: China: Crude Death Rate (deaths per 1000 population) 1950-197534 
 
The result was a population explosion as the fertility rate remained on a high level while 
the mortality rate dropped continuously. In 1950 a new marriage-law was introduced, 
but with the goal to improve the role of women in society rather than to influence 
population developments.35   
Additionally the first Baby Boom from 1949 to 1957 also became noticeable and the 
outcome, showing that the population was one third larger than expected shocked the 
government and lead to more engagement in the field of population policies.36  
Although birth control was introduced to a certain extent in 1956 and the Abortion Act 
lead to the legalisation of abortions, family planning was for a long time not seen as the 
solution to control the population increase and so the main actions remained the 
distribution of information material pointing out the positive consequences of a smaller 
family.37 Special committees were introduced to spread this information; however, they 
remained virtually unseen and disappeared soon after their implementation.  
                                                
33 cf. Beaglehole / Bonita 1997: p.227 et sequ. 
34 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Crude Death Rate 
35 cf. Tien 1987: p.442 
36 cf. Zhu 2003: p.463 
37 cf. Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.348 
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On the whole, the first initiatives announced in the 1950s to control births were 
introduced with the sole aim to improve maternal and child health and not to control 
population growth.38 This assumption is also reflected in the very minor decrease in the 
birth rate of the 50s and 60s that can be seen in figure 3.  
 
China: Birth Rate (1950-1975)
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Figure 3: China: Crude Birth Rate (births per 1000 population) 1950-197539  
 
In the 1960s a number of initiatives were realised to influence population growth but it 
has to be noticed that most of them evolved very slowly and had only a limited impact. 
In 1961, late marriage was set up as the main goal in population planning measures; yet 
slight success was only reached in urban areas.  
In this phase Zhou Enlai was the one who tried very enthusiastically to develop a new 
family policy following his own principle “one is not too few, two are ideal, and three 
are too many”40. Yet, it seems obvious that due to the establishment of the Commune 
System in the course of the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1961, the Great Famine 
from 1959 to 1961 and the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 197641 Zhou’s plans 
remained largely unnoticed as other problems were to tackle. During this phase most of 
the family planning programmes were postponed to some point in the future.  
Another Baby Boom from 1962 to 197042, the logical consequence after such a long 
time of destruction and suppression, and the more stable situation provided the basis for 
the introduction of a concrete population policy by the Chinese government.. 
                                                
38 cf. Peng 1991: p.27 
39 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Crude Birth Rate 
40 Tien 1987: p.442  
41 cf. Twitchett / Fairbank 1991: p.231 et sequ., p.641 et sequ.  
42 cf. Ma 2012: p.118 
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It was the time when Mao finally realized the lack of involvement and the need to act. A 
leading group for family planning was launched and contraceptives were offered free of 
charge in the whole of China.43 
Following this basic decisions, Premier Zhou Enlai managed to establish the third and 
by then largest family policy “Later Longer Fewer” (Wan, Xi, Shao) in 1971, which 
notably should promote later marriage, longer time spans between births and fewer 
children.44  
The original intent of the Chinese government in phasing in family planning policy was two-fold: to 
face the challenge of feeding its rapidly growing population and to minimize the imbalance between 
the nation’s economic development and population growth by restricting fertility rates.45 
 
During this phase, Ma Yinchu was rehabilitated and his theory was formally accepted as 
it had proven itself right. He was then made honorary president of Beijing University.46  
Although there were virtually no coercive sanctions during this time, this policy proved 
to work very efficiently. From 1970 to 1980 fertility quickly declined, particularly due 
to the availability of contraceptives and propaganda broadcasting the idea that a smaller 
family would bring benefits to every member of society. The total fertility rate dropped 
from 6 to 2.5 children per woman. (see figure 5) 
With the end of the Mao Era and the promotion of Deng Xiaoping and his Policy of 
Reform and Opening the Chinese leadership decided that a too rapidly growing society 
would be a great burden for the country’s development and its rise to power; therefore 
they saw the need to step in as a stabilising agent by realising the four modernisations of 
agriculture, industry, national defence as well as science and technology.47  
The second census conducted in 1979 and population projections by two scientists, 
Song Jian and Yu Jingyuan48, unearthed the fact that China‘s population was 
approaching one billion (see figure 4). It can be assumed that this number certainly 
raised fears that the gains that had been achieved in the past years would be reversed.49  
                                                
43 cf. Peng 1991: p.23 
44 cf. Tsai 1987: p.569 
45 Chiu 2004: p.5 
46 cf. Li 1995: p. 261 
47 cf. Yuan 2010: p.105 
48 cf. Poston / Dudley 2010: p.349 
49 cf. Greenhalgh 2005/2: p.260 et sequ. 
15  
The One-Child-Policy 
 
This led to the government’s decision to intervene with measures that were harsher than 
ever before to strictly control the growth of China`s population. Thereupon, family 
planning was included in the new Chinese Constitution in 1982 and the One-Child-
Policy was introduced.  
 
This new situation represented an incremental development of past policies:  
 
The family planning programme is based on three policies of long standing: those of late marriage, 
late pregnancy and fewer births. Of these the third element is now being reinterpreted so as to make 
the one-child family [...] the basic norm.50 
 
The main motivation behind this policy was the country’s economic growth.  At that 
time statistics forecasted that a drop to a fertility rate of 0.8 and a population of less than 
1.2 billion in the year 2000 could keep the population growth under control and make 
the planned increase of the per capita income from 250 USD in 1979 to about 800-1000 
USD at the turn of the century possible.51 (see figure 4) 
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Figure 4: China: Population Growth 1820-200852 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Saith 1982: p.493 
51 cf. Peng 1991: p.24 
52 cf. Maddison 2008 
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After the introduction of this new family policy every woman was only allowed to have 
one child. On the one hand the government offered economic incentives such as 
financial assistance, housing, additional farmland, schooling fee reductions, free 
medical care, etc. to the parents who followed the new regulations and stressed that the 
policy must be applied on a voluntary basis. On the other hand the special family 
planning bureaus at provincial and local levels often did not refrain from using strict 
measures and even force to implement the new laws and to reach their given quotas. 
Abortions or sterilisations were enforced; financial sanctions were conducted and if it 
was already too late, many families also became victims of forced infanticide.53  
 
Regional disparities of the population policies  
 
What is necessary to be mentioned is that the One-Child-Policy however had varying 
effects and the demographic situation differed in rural and urban areas and from 
province to province mainly influenced by “socio-cultural factors, the degree of 
governmental control, and socio economic considerations”. 54 While in urban areas the 
compliance with the policy was nearly universal, it met substantial resistance in rural 
areas. Additionally the level of implementation and application of the incentives and 
punishments mentioned earlier varied.  
Most of the families having more than one child live in remote areas as the government 
could not reach out as easily to control the peasantry, while in the cities reglations were 
carried out more easily, severe punishments could however be found in both rural and 
urban areas. In urban areas people also became more obedient as they saw the direct 
consequences of the rapidly growing population that was not as visible to rural peasants, 
who in turn felt less pressure to reduce their family size. 55 In rural areas a big family 
was assumed to provide a more efficient workforce that could offer the family better 
economic prospects and more support during old age. Additionally the living situation 
one faced also plaid a vital role, as especially urban areas became more crowded and 
one could only afford small flats due to rising housing prices which further lowered the 
possibilities for families to have more children.56 The government also faced the 
hardship of having to step up against long lasting traditions such as the son preference.57  
                                                
53 cf. Skalla 2004: p.336, p.346 et sequ. 
54 Snyder 2000: p. 1  
55 cf. Snyder 2000: p.16 et sequ.  
56 cf. Powell / Cook 2007: p.93 et sequ.  
57 cf. Poston et al 2006: p.149 
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This and the different extent of economic development58 results in varying rates with 
regard to mortality and fertility. This also influences the level of demographic transition 
and its consequences from region to region.   
During China’s rapid industrialization, state economic development has centred on 
urban industrial progress. This development has tended to strengthen the infrastructure 
of services in urban areas at the expense of rural areas.  
 
Phases of the One-Child-Policy 
 
The One-Child-Policy evolved in five phases.59 In the first phase, the restrictions were 
very harsh in terms of quantity. The second phase began in 1984 when the main goal of 
the policy became quality; parents in particular began to rethink the traditional extended 
family system and wanted to offer their children better lives. As a result of this change, 
the government adapted a more human approach and started to allow exceptions from 
the one child limit for minorities, parents that were single children themselves, who had 
remarried or in the case of a physically or mentally handicapped first child. The third 
phase started in the late 1980s when it became clear that the desired results could not be 
reached. It was agreed on that the policy needed to be enforced even more strictly than 
before and additional regulative institutions needed to be installed.  
In the year 2000, the fourth phase commenced when criticism about China’s human 
rights violations grew rapidly and the One-Child-Policy was classified as one of the 
harshest population policies worldwide.60 It is interesting to note that it was only in 
2001 that the one child policy was first embodied into national law while it already had 
such a vast effect as a policy even before the government took this step.61  
The rapid fertility drop since the 1960s which can partially be traced back to the 
measures applied during the population planning period becomes clear when analyzing 
figure 5.  
 
The Chinese central authorities enforce an unpopular birth-control policy by exerting the local 
authorities to coerce the people and to force them to accept the program’s mandates. The pressure 
continues until opposition becomes so strong that a relaxation of the policy occurs, which itself leads 
to more new births than can be allowed, thus leading to another wave of coercion. This causes the 
kinds of fluctuations one sees in China’s vacillating fertility rates.62 
                                                
58 cf. Poston et al 2006: p.142 
59 cf. Greenhalgh 2005/2: p.212 et sequ. 
60 cf. Skalla 2004: p.334 
61 cf. Greenhalgh 2008: p.319 
62 Aird in Poston / Bouvier 2010: p.349 
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Figure 5: China: Total Fertility Rate (children per woman) 1950-201063 
 
Today the One-Child-Policy is still the core concept of the Chinese population and 
family planning programme and the population growth is regulated by its binding laws. 
Yet due to the growing pressure of ageing it is becoming more flexible and slowly 
moving towards a Two-Child-Policy, allowing most of the families where both parents 
themselves were only-children or whose first child is a girl to have another child.64 This 
can be seen as the start of a new and therefore fifth phase of this policy. 
From a certain point of view the policy was a success, as the growth rate slowed down, 
which was said to enable the further development of the country. Even though the 
population momentum still keeps the population growing (see figure 4), it is by far 
slower than it would have been without the Chinese population policy. It is being 
estimated that without the One-Child-Policy there would have been 300 to 400 million 
more births within the past 30 to 40 years.65   
On the other hand, the One-Child-Policy caused much harm and sorrow. Whole 
generations still suffer from the horrible actions they were forced to undertake. In some 
areas, especially in the cities, there is less coercion today and more free will involved 
when reducing the number of offspring while in some remote areas the regulations were 
and often still are being ignored.66   
Obviously not only the Chinese people are troubled by the existing family laws; the 
government too will have to face new challenges arising from its interference. An 
unnatural gender ratio, too few people in the working class, few school children and of 
course the problem many countries face nowadays — a rapidly ageing society and an 
                                                
63 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Total Fertility Rate 
64 cf. Sanderson / Tan 1995: p.115 et sequ.  
65 cf. Den Boer / Hudson 2011 
66 cf. Greenhalgh 2005/2: p.232 et sequ. 
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inadequate pension and support system are just some of the challenges China will be 
confronted with in the future. These factors will be focused on in a later chapter after 
taking a closer look at the population evolution in Japan within the last centuries.  
  
2.2.2 Population evolution in Japan  
 
In comparison to the vast and still ongoing family planning programmes in China, Japan 
experienced less coercive and a smaller number of governmentally induced population 
regulation measures during a brief period of its history — “instead, economic and social 
pressures produced a strong motivation for fertility control.” 67 Following an 
observation by Vogt it seems apparent that the rather limited interference within the 
realm of family life derives from the historical and ideological taboos that have a long 
tradition in Japan.68 
The first stage of the Japanese demographic transition characterized by a pre-modern 
society and a high birth and high death rate can be found in Japan before and during the 
Tokugawa period (1603–1868). The first immense population growth occurred after the 
first modernization movement during the Meiji-Restoration in 1868 and paralleled the 
modernization movement at the beginning of the 20th century. The continuous political 
and economical improvements caused a rapid decline of the death rate and a rise in 
fertility gradually leading to the second phase of the Japanese demographic transition at 
the turn of the century.  
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Figure 6: Japan: Crude Death Rate (deaths per 1000 population) 1873-198069 
                                                
67 Kuroda 1987: p.18 
68 cf. Vogt 2008: p.17 
69 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan: Crude Death Rate 
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The rapid reduction in mortality was largely due to improved nutrition, higher hygiene 
standards and better overall public health provided by the government.  
Especially infant and child mortality declined in part due to the ban of mabiki 
(infanticide) and datai (induced abortions) in 1880.70 All this resulted in a rapidly 
growing population from 34.98 million in 1873 to 73.9 million in 194371, while the 
number of live births rose from 809,487 in 1873 to 2,253,535 in 1943.72  
The government considered this a positive development at first. Until the first half of 
the 20th century, Japanese officials also considered a large population favourable for a 
country’s development. In China this pronatalist attitude was maintained several 
decades longer. 
 
To maintain a high fertility, it took the legislative step of prohibiting abortion and infanticide, which 
had been widely practiced during the Edo era. In addition, the government prohibited the manufacture 
and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices in an effort to suppress birth control.73  
 
At the beginning of the 20th century, a group of scientists began to speculate about the 
dangerous effects of rapid population growth. In 1927, a Board of Inquiry on 
Population and Food Problems was convened.74 Unexpectedly, they did not discuss the 
ongoing population growth but instead debated how food production could be increased 
to supply the growing Japanese population.  
The Guidelines for Establishing Population Policy introduced in 1942 continued to 
support population growth though additional measures supporting pregnant women and 
nursing mothers and by offering tax benefits to larger families.75  
While figure 6 illustrates the drop of the crude death rate at the end of the 19th century 
and the early 20th century, figure 7 clearly shows the continuous rise in the number of 
births from 1873 to the 1920s, which is characteristic for the second phase of 
demographic transition.  
 
                                                
70 cf. Atoh 2003: p.8 
71 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
72 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
73 Inoue 2001: p.25  
74 cf. Okazaki in Inoue 2001: p.25 
75 cf. Okazaki in Inoue 2001: p.25 
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Japan: Birth Rate (1873-1930)
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Figure 7: Japan: Crude Birth Rate (births per 1000 population) 1873-193076 
 
As the fertility started to drop especially during the Second World War, the pronatalist 
attitude was kept up.77 However, this preference decreased as the longing for a smaller 
yet economically stronger family grew, paralleled by the rising presence of feminist 
movements for self-determination, the spreading out of educational possibilities and the 
reduction of illiteracy.  
In the 1930s, Japan moved into the third phase of the demographic transition 
characterised by a substantial decline of its fertility in the following decades as shown in 
figure 8.  
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Figure 8: Japan: Crude Birth Rate (births per 1000 population)78 
 
                                                
76 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
77 cf. Norgren 2001: p.22 et sequ. 
78 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
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Japan experienced a Baby Boom after the Second World War in the years from 1947 to 
1949 (see figure 8), this was earlier compared to China where the Baby Boom started in 
1949 due to the civil war which lasted from 1945 to 1949. The population growth 
resulting from these Baby Booms could be felt stronger in Japan than in China as the 
land reforms, the Great Leap (1958-1960)79 and the Great Famine (1959-1961) at the 
same time slowed the growth rate in the PRC (see figure 4). 80   
During the occupation by the allied forces, further pressure to introduce population 
planning measures was imposed. This finally led to the introduction of various 
organisations trying to make birth control an accepted method of family planning. The 
government yet did not let go of its pronatalist stance to support population growth.  
In 1951 the Japanese Cabinet and the Ministry of Health and Welfare began to promote 
birth control. All of a sudden contraceptive production and their usage rose.81 With the 
realisation of the new National Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 allowing sterilizations 
and abortions under certain circumstances, Japanese society suddenly had access to a 
great variety of methods to determine the number of children.82 
 
Japan experienced a precipitous decline in fertility during the decade following the postwar baby 
boom of 1947-49, and then her fertility rates leveled off. The rapid decline in fertility paralleled 
liberalization of abortion laws and an active campaign to disseminate contraceptive information.83  
 
As can be seen in figure 9 the sharpest drop in fertility appeared after the post-war Baby 
Boom and another one in 1966 which was due to believes in the negative impact of the 
year of the fire horse Hinoeuma84. From 1971 to 1974 Japan experienced a second Baby 
Boom resulting from the first boom. In sum the TFR from 1960 onwards towards the 
turn of the century was rather stable indicating just a steady and slight decline.  
 
                                                
79 cf. Yuan et al. 2010: p.100 
80 cf. Ma 2012: p. 117 et sequ. 
81 cf. Inoue 2001: p.30  
82 cf. Masanori in Schultz 1974: p.234  
83 Masanori 1974: p.225 
84 cf. Masanori in Schultz 1974: p.171 
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Japan: Total Fertility Rate (1930-2003)
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Figure 9: Japan: Total Fertility Rate 1930-200385 
 
It can be assumed that this stability since the 1950s encouraged the government to stop 
any further activities in the field of family planning, while the economic-slow-down 
during this phase led to a move away from the pronatalist position. In the ensuing 
decades the government retreated from any major actions in the field of family 
planning.86 
Although demographers in Japan had had keen interest in this below-replacement-
fertility phenomenon and tried to analyze its demographic as well as social and 
economic causes, the Japanese government remained passive during the 1970s and 
1980s87 while the overall population was still growing as shown in figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Japan: Population Growth 1884-200088 
                                                
85 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
86 cf. Inoue 2001: p.31 et sequ.  
87 cf. Atoh / Akachi 2003: p.1  
88 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
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In the late 20th and early 21st centuries Japan took action and introduced policies to 
induce a better regional distribution and slowly began to react to the appearing 
population challenges. The aim of these measures was to slow the continuing population 
growth and to react adequately to the challenges it posed. The variety of factors leading 
to the continuous fertility reduction and the consequences deriving from it will be 
discussed in more detail in the following chapters in comparison to the developments in 
China. 
 
2.2.3 Demographic Transformation Compared  
 
Previous chapters reveal that when taking a closer look at the population development 
of the Chinese and the Japanese societies it becomes apparent that both underwent a 
similar population transition in the last two centuries as predicted by the Demographic 
Transition Model earlier mentioned. As the PRC is characterized by a great regional 
disparity in its economic and social development some areas are even further in their 
demographic transition than others, especially remote regions lag behind.  
In general terms however the findings suggest that what differs is the speed and 
magnitude of these two countries’ population changes, the timeframe when these 
changes occurred and especially the extent of government influence and economic 
advancements.  
The analysis shows that while the government and its family planning policies in China 
put stronger pressure on the society and the PRC’s demographic development, in Japan 
it was rather the rapid and relatively early economic development (improved 
technologies, higher incomes etc.),  the political stability and new ways of thinking and 
the resulting modern lifestyle (education, contraceptive technology, female 
empowerment and greater female labour market participation, etc.) that accounted for 
great changes in its population structure rather than its population policies.89  
Figures 11 and 12, showing the development of birth and death rates in China and Japan 
over the last centuries, will be used in this chapter to analyze and compare the 
demographic transition of these two countries.  
 
                                                
89 cf. Canning 2011: p.4 et sequ. 
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China: Birth Rate and Death Rate
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Figure 11: China: Birth and Death Rate (per 1000 population) 1949-200690 
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Figure 12: Japan: Crude Birth and Death Rate (per 1000 population) 1873-200491 
 
The first phase consists of a fairly stationary population, characterized by high and 
slightly fluctuating birth and death rates and a stable population with only slight natural 
increase. Underdeveloped health care keeps the death rate high, especially for infants, 
while families are forced to have many children during this pre-industrial phase in order 
to keep pace with the high demand for labour by its main economic sector of farming. 
These factors in turn influence the maintenance of a high level fertility rate.  
                                                
90 cf. National Bureau of Statistics 2007 
91 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan 
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It is apparent from figure 12 that the first phase for Japan ranges from before 1873 until 
the 1920s. For China there is no data regarding death and birth rates at such an early 
phase since the first Chinese National census was only carried out in 1953. Japan on the 
other hand had already conducted population estimates and collected regional household 
and family related data since 1872.92 
It can be assumed however, taking figure 13 into account that the steady population size 
in China resulted from relatively stable birth and death rates in the latter half of the 19th 
century.  
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Figure 13: Population China 1820-200893 
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Figure 14: Population Japan 1820-200894  
 
Japan began its second phase of the demographic transition in the 1920s, when the death 
rate suddenly began to drop sharply while the birth rate remained comparatively high. 
Here it becomes clear that China had already passed into the second phase with a time 
lag as its death rate started dropping much later, around the time of the formation of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.  
                                                
92 cf. Statistic Bureau Japan no year: p.1 et sequ. 
93 cf. Maddison 2008 
94 cf. Maddison 2008 
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In Japan the second phase ended in the 1930s when it experienced a sharp drop in its 
birth rate and the total fertility rate declined continuously from above 4.5 in the late 
1940s to about 2 children per women in the early 1960s (see figure 15). In comparison 
China experienced a decline in the birth rate and therefore the third phase started only in 
the 1960s with a time lag of about two decades.   
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Figure 15: China and Japan: Total Fertility Rate 1950-201095 
 
The only time in the third phase when the fertility rate did not decline was in the early 
1960s and in the 1980s in China (see figure 5) and in the late 1940s and the 1960s in 
Japan after the end of the Second World War (see figure 8). This was due to the Baby 
Boom generations that frequently follow times of crisis and war.  
What also needs to be mentioned in this context is that during times of crisis a trend of 
rising death rates and falling birth rates resulting from a lack of security may be 
recognisable for example in both countries during the Second World War or in China 
during the Great Leap Forward and the famines during this phase. This shows that the 
transition theory offers just a model of demographic transition, which cannot be seen as 
a completely linear trend. (see figure 11 and 12)  
The stable fourth phase with a low birth and a low death rate that only fluctuates 
slightly started in Japan in the 1990s and in China only during the first decade of the 
21st century.  
                                                
95 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Total Fertility Rate 
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Figures 16 and 17 indicate that Japan, as well as China, are already leaving stage four 
and moving on to stage five of the demographic transition model as their fertility rates 
are dropping below the replacement rate.(see figure 14) 
This leaves the countries with a very low birth rate while the death rate stays on a 
continuously low level or declines even further due to a continuous rise in life 
expectancy. (see figures 16 and 17) 
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Figure 16: China and Japan: Crude Birth Rate (births per 1000 population) 1950-201096 
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Figure 17: China and Japan: Life Expectancy at birth 1950-201097 
                                                
96 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Crude Birth Rate 
97 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Life Expectancy 
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Figure 18 shows the growth rate of these two populations. The graph indicates that both 
rates are continuously declining, except for the humps marking the Baby Boom 
generations which follow extreme lows during times of crisis.  
While China’s growth rate is declining at a slower pace and is still above 0.5 percent 
between 2000 and 2010, Japan has been experiencing an extreme population decrease 
since 2005. It is projected that until 2050 Japan will face a population reduction rate of 
about 1 percent and therefore will experience a depopulation movement resulting from 
the subsequent declining birth rate and a fertility rate of less than 1.2. It is predicted that 
in 2050 the population will be 11 percent smaller than in 1990.98 
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Figure 18: Population Growth Rate (%) 1950-201099 
 
The analysis in chapter two reveals that Japan and China, both underwent a 
demographic transition from a pre-industrial to an modernised society within a few 
decades. 
 
It is important to consider the influence of the rate at which countries progress through various stages 
of the demographic transition [...] while Nothern European and North American countries tookover 
200 years to steadily move through the demographic transition, in east Asia the transition orrcured 
much moire rapid.100  
 
                                                
98 cf. Mason 2001: p.78 
99 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Population Growth Rate 
100 Davies / James 2011 : p.95 
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Overall one notes that China follows a similar pattern as Japan however findings 
support the presumption that China surpassed certain phases with a time lag of about 20 
years. This time span can, in relation to marriage and child bearing age in the PRC, be 
assumed as one generation. In recent years, however, China and especially the more 
developed and urban regions are catching up with Japan at a faster pace. (see figure 19) 
Some regions in the PRC however lag behind further resulting from their lower level of 
development.  
The previous chapters offered an insight into past and present demographic changes in 
general in China as well as in Japan. It was revealed that as assumed both countries 
already arrived at stage five of the demographic transition model with rapid ageing 
becoming a core problem.  Chapter three will therefore analyze and compare this 
process in detail to find out the challenges awaiting these two East Asian countries in 
the years to come.    
 
 
Figure 19: Phases of demographic transition China and Japan 
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3. The Ageing Phenomenon  
 
 
All over the world many already industrialized countries and emerging economies are 
starting to experience a new direction in population developments, the ageing 
phenomenon:  
 
Population ageing, the process whereby older individuals account for a proportionally larger share of 
the total population, was a key demographic outcome of population trends during the twentieth 
century and will surely be the distinctive trait of populations during the twenty-first century.101 
 
This unprecedented phenomenon is characterized by a society which has passed the 
fourth demographic transition phase of stable death and birth rates and crossed over into 
the fifth demographic transition stage where fertility rates drop below the replacement 
rates, life expectancy rises to an unprecedented high (see figure 20) and a large 
proportion of the population belongs to the old and the oldest old age groups (see figure 
21). Not receiving special attention before the mid 20th century ageing became a topic of 
international interest in the year 1982 when the Assembly on Ageing was first held in 
Vienna to begin examining the phenomenon and its socio-economic ramifications.102 
 
    
  
Figure 20: Total Fertility Rate and           Figure 21: Average annual growth rate total and                           
Life Expectancy at birth: world 1950-2050103                 Population aged 60 or over: world 1950-2050104 
 
 
                                                
101 United Nations Population Division 2010: p.1 
102  cf. UN Programme on Ageing 1982 
103  cf. United Nations Population Division 2010: p.5 
104  cf. United Nations Population Division 2010: p.12 
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The ageing process and the changes in the age structure vary in terms of extent and pace 
of change between different countries. Generally, however it can be observed that the 
greatest demographic shifts are found in more developed and industrialized countries 
rather than in less developed regions which are still in early phases of industrialization 
and therefore also in early phases of the demographic transition.(see figure 22) 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Population proportion aged 60 or over: world and development regions 1950-2050105 
 
Regardless of location, when societies grow old, this will reveal consequences that must 
not be ignored as they may vastly influence a region’s future development. Population 
ageing can have an impact on political, social and economic processes and could inhibit 
the well-being of a whole nation.  
In the developed world, ageing is already widely seen as one of the great challenges in 
the upcoming decades and the fears of an ageing crisis are definitely noticeable. In the 
less developed countries, there is still a tendency to take an observant approach when it 
comes to ageing societies, which may turn out to be a great misjudgement one day.   
 
 
                                                
105 cf. United Nations Population Division 2010: p.11 
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3.1 Two East Asian Ageing Societies 
 
What makes ageing in East Asia so exceptional and important to analyse is the great 
speed of this process and the different cultural context. The question of how China and 
Japan are reacting to the rapid demographic transition having occurred in the past 
decades, their extent of ageing and the processes accelerating this transition will be 
elaborated and compared in the chapters to come.  
Today, Japan is the country with the oldest population and China the one with the 
greatest absolute number of elderly. This makes East Asia as a whole the oldest region 
population wise, with two thirds of the elderly world-wide living there. “The increase in 
the proportion of the elderly population is expected to proceed at an internationally 
unprecedented speed and attain levels hitherto never experienced.” 106  
Many scientists refer to today’s ageing phase as one of heavy ageing, especially since 
the proportion of elderly persons began to exceed the 20 percent margin. This is an 
alarming development not only for countries such as China and Japan but also for every 
other nation around the world.  
In order to realize the magnitude of the problems societies in East Asia will be facing 
with a continuously ageing society, it is now necessary to take a look at the future trend 
and the predictions that can be made.  
 
 
 
Figure 23: Population below the age of 5 and above 65 years 1950-2050107 
                                                
106  Kuroda 1987: p.16 
107 cf. National Institute on Aging 2007: p.6 
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3.1.1 Outlook on future population development 
 
As analyzed in the previous sections, it is obvious that the societies in China and Japan 
both have already moved rapidly towards the fifth stage of demographic transition. 
Fewer and fewer children are born and the total fertility rate continues to decline. Both, 
China as well as Japan have already crossed the line of the replacement rate of 2.1 
children per woman that could keep the population stable.   
Japan first crossed the 2.1 mark in 1966, the year of the horse, which is said to be a bad 
year for girls to be born. Yet, in the 1960s this was only an exception. Since 1975, 
however, Japan has continuously ranged beneath a total fertility rate of 2.1 while China 
maintained a total fertility rate of above 2.1 until the mid 1990s. By then Japan’s 
fertility rate had already dropped below 1.5. Ever since both countries’ total fertility 
rates have not risen again and even continued to decline further. (see figure 24) As 
mentioned in the introduction statistical data from the PRC has to be used with care. 
Especially with regard to the number of children born as underreporting is a frequently 
used method to bypass national population regulations. Therefore the fertility rate in 
several regions ranks higher than official statistics say.  
Taking the low variant of UN Population Projections into account, China could end up 
with a TFR of 1.35 and Japan with a TFR of 1.10 in 2050, which would then be one of 
the lowest, if not the lowest worldwide.108 Without any countermeasures such an 
alarming development would obviously lead to a dramatic population decline in both 
countries.  
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Figure 24: China and Japan: Total Fertility Rate (children per woman); 
 medium variant projections109 
                                                
108 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Total Fertility Rate 
109 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Total Fertility Rate 
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Crude Birth Rate (1950-2050)
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Figure 25: China and Japan: Crude Birth Rate (births per 1000 population) 1950-2050;  
medium variant projections110 
 
Analysis show that not only fewer children are being born (see figure 25), which 
accelerates the ageing process but also that further reduction in mortality contributes to 
the situation to a considerable extent. Statistics show that the declining death rates at 
this stage no longer mainly result from the reduced infant and child mortality but 
especially from the longer life expectancy of older people. Moreover, this trend is likely 
to ascend even further in the coming decades as estimates in figure 26 show.   
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Figure 26: China and Japan: Life Expectancy at birth 1950-2050, 
medium variant predictions111 
 
 
                                                
110 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Crude Birth Rate 
111 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Life Expectancy 
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Further examination reveals that Japan’s Ageing Index112 has already risen from 14.0 in 
1950 to 119.1 in 2000113 and China’s Index rose from 14.6 in 1982 to 30 in the year 
2000114. And still there are also a considerable number of people in middle-age (50 to 
64 years) that will soon be part of the elderly population segment, leading to a further 
rise of the Ageing Index in the PRC.  
Figure 27 reveals another fact that accompanies the expected changes. It shows how the 
median age of the population will ascend in the coming decades. The medium variant 
projection estimates that in 2050 Chinese median age will lie around 45, while in Japan 
this number will be even higher around 55 years.  
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Figure 27: China and Japan: Median Age (years) 1950-2050,  
medium variant predictions115 
 
Looking at the low variant projections, the outcome is even more dramatic with 50.5 for 
China and 59.8 for Japan, which is close to their retirement ages and once more shows 
the challenges governments will be confronted with.116  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
112 Note: Ageing Index = Persons 60 and over per 100 youths under the age of 15 (United Nations    
Population Division 2001: World Population Ageing 1950-2050 Annex) 
113 cf. Ogawa 2005: p.211 
114 cf. Kuroda 1987: p.11 et sequ.  
115 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Median Age – medium variant  
116 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Median Age – low variant 
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By 2025 the ratio of workers to retirees in Japan who need to be supported will be two 
to one while by 2010 it was still three to one, additionally its population will shrink 
from 127.77 million in 2007 to 95.15 million in 2050.117 China’s ratio of working-age to 
non-working-age population in 2010 was above 2,5 and is expected to drop to 1.6 by 
2050.118 
The two factors of demographic changes, fertility and mortality, are the main 
determinants that will influence the future population structure in China and Japan. 
There are, however, other factors affecting these two parameters, such as health care, 
education, age of marriage, divorce rates, work-life balance, social security etc., that 
exert further pressure and need to be taken into account.  
Even though similar population developments with reference to ageing can be identified 
in both countries they derive from different backgrounds. While in China the 
demographic transition is strongly influenced by the government and its population 
policies that were introduced and are still carried out119, in Japan this was not the case, 
while consequences of modernization such as better health care provision, better 
educational possibilities and working conditions and an ensuing rise of living standards 
due to higher incomes were some of the reasons leading to its high elderly ratio.  
How will the Chinese and Japanese societies and their population structure develop if 
the predictions come true or if they evolve even more dramatically?  
In order to estimate the outcome we need to take a closer look at the age structure at 
present but also analyze the future projections to see the extent of the ageing problem.  
Focussing on the age groups 65 plus and 80 plus120, figures 28 to 31 give a clear insight 
into the dimensions that the greying of the Chinese and Japanese society could have. 
Although Japan will remain one step ahead of China and will experience an even earlier 
ageing process, it is clearly revealed that China is on the way to become a society 
dominated by a large proportion of people above 65 years of age.121 
 
                                                
117 cf. Lam 2009: p.1   
118 cf. Banister et al. 2010: p.6 
119 cf. Banister et al. 2010: p.1  
120 Note: Following the commonly used definition of aging in social sciences old people   
     are defined as those aged over 65 and the oldest old being those aged over 80.        
    (United Nation Population Division 2001: World Population Ageing 1950 -2050) 
121 cf. Zhou / Liu 2010: p. 563 
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Figure 28: China and Japan: Aged 65 or over (%) 1950-2050, 
 medium variant projections122 
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Figure 29: China and Japan: Aged 65 or over (%) 1950-2050,  
low variant projections123 
 
 
                                                
122 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Aged 65 or over 
123 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Aged 65 or over 
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Figure 30: China and Japan: Aged 80 or over (%) 1950-2050,  
medium variant projections124 
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Figure 31: China and Japan: Aged 80 or over (%) 1950-2050, 
 low variant projections125 
 
The changes in population structure in China and Japan and the high percentage of old 
age people and retirees will inevitably result in a broad spectrum of consequences and 
social tasks governments and institutions will have to undertake. In certain 
circumstances there may be positive side effects such as a longer life; yet the majority 
will have a negative impact on society and every single individual.  
 
                                                
124 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Aged 80 or over 
125 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Aged 80 or over 
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3.2 New Challenges Arise 
 
The preceding analysis unambiguously reveals the fact that the percentage of old aged 
people is on the increase in many countries with two undisputable examples being 
China and Japan. (see figure 19) 
 
Many countries in Asia, particular in East Asia, are now on the edge of drastic demographic changes. 
Some countries will face demographic challenges related to a declining share of their working 
populations and an increase in the share of aged dependents as early as 2015-2020. This is expected to 
have adverse effects on their economic performance and prospects through a decrease in the labor 
force, and lower saving and investment rates.126 
 
However, why is ageing becoming such a great challenge for certain countries more 
than for others and why is this occurring in different time frames? In reflecting on the 
current discussion concerning the ageing crisis, it becomes clear that the greying society 
is especially going to be a defiance to those countries which age at such a high rate and 
for that reason lack the possibility to prepare adequately and on time for the side effects 
of the ageing process. Those countries that through population policies interfered with 
their population development thereby even intensified the already existing transitional 
forces.  
To better understand the urgency with which the ageing crisis has to be handled the 
most important challenges of ageing shall be observed in the following sections.  
 
3.2.1 Population decline and the dependency ratio 
 
Observing the population growth rates of China and Japan (see figure 32), it is clearly 
revealed that in both countries these rates are decreasing and will be decreasing even 
further in the future. 
In China the population decrease would have been even greater due to the low fertility; 
however, the population momentum deriving from the second Baby Boom (1962-1970) 
delayed this development. Japan, on the other hand, already crossed the line of a 
positive growth rate. In 2005 the growth still accounted for a 0.05 percent annual 
increase while in 2010 the population shrank already by 0.8 percent.127  
 
                                                
126 Nizzamuddin et al. 2006: p.1 
127 cf. Statistical Bureau Japan 
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Figure 32: China and Japan: Population Growth Rate (%), medium variant projections128 
 
It is significant to mention that in both countries the age group which will decline most 
will be the one between the ages 0 to 14 years and the segment between 15 and 64 years 
which consists of the economically active population.  
In order to recognize the severe consequences this decline will entail, a closer look has 
to be taken at the dependency ratio (DR), which is an important aspect concerning 
“shifts in the balance between working people and the children and elderly whom they 
support.” 129 It defines the relation of those that are not in the working age (below 14 
and over 65) to those in working age (15-64).  
When the ratio increases, the pressure on the working population rises as this segment 
needs to support more and more of the non-working population. Those who belong to 
the group of actively working people have to pay for the children below the age of 15 
that are not yet working-age adults as well as for the group of retirees (double pressure).  
The reduced number of working-age adults resulting from the birth reduction over the 
past decades and the rising percentage of elderly due to the higher life expectancy, lead 
to a growing dependency ratio. This development will turn out more problematic for 
those states that suddenly lack the money to support the children and the elderly.  
 
Many Asian countries do not yet have the necessary institutions and financial systems in place to 
provide for a large dependent elderly population. They will need efficient and well-managed pension 
and health–care programs, capital markets, and accounting and regulatory systems.130 
 
                                                
128 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Population Growth Rate 
129 Westley 2001: p.3  
130 Westley 2001: p.4 
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Apart from the total dependency ratio one may further distinguish between the juvenile 
or child dependency ratio and the aged dependency ratio. Figure 33 concentrates on the 
old-age dependency ratio of China and Japan, which is constantly facing an upwards 
trend and is predicted to augment steeply in the decades to come. This factor may 
explain once more the severity of rapid ageing of a population.  
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Figure 33: China and Japan: Old Age Dependency Ration (%) 1950-2050, medium projections131 
 
With respect to the previously mentioned population momentum the old-age 
dependency ratio for China was rising relatively slowly132, compared to Japan which 
has been experiencing an extreme rise since the 1990s as its fertility decline was so 
spectacular that even the Baby Boom generations and their offspring could not keep the 
level stable. The future prediction, though, also estimates a catching up by China within 
the next decades.  
Another way of illustrating the changing age structure of a population more precisely is 
by using population pyramids referring to both age and gender.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
131 cf. UN Population Revision 2008: Old-Age Dependency Ratio 
132 cf. Li et al. 2007: p.19 
43  
 
 
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
Fig 34: China and Japan: Age Pyramids 1990–2050133 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
133 cf. United States Census Bureau 
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In the case of China and Japan the population pyramids for the years 1990, 2009 and 
2050 (see figure 34) show clearly the upward movement of the age structure resulting 
from increasing longevity and the rise of the percentage of the population above the age 
of 60. This is accompanied by the reduction of fertility which becomes evident when 
taking a closer look at the narrowing base of the pyramids.  
The graphs explicitly illustrate the already obtained finding of a time lag of 20 years 
between the population transition of China and Japan. Comparing the pyramid of Japan 
in the year 1990 and China in 2009 a similar pattern and shape can be observed, with 
the Baby Boom generations being in the age sector of 15 and around 40, the narrowing 
base of the pyramid resulting from fewer births and the broadening top of the pyramid 
due to the rising life expectancy.   
When looking further into the future, at the pyramids for the year 2050, the quite similar 
structure shows the Baby Boomers ending up at old age in Japan, and China, catching 
up in the ageing process as that was already revealed earlier.   
 
3.2.2 Living standards and new health risks 
 
In accordance with the reduction in mortality, many countries around the world 
experience a rising life expectancy due in particular to improved health care, sanitation, 
hygiene and nutrition resulting predominantly from economic development. 
Additionally, it becomes clear that a modern lifestyle that derives from higher incomes 
and better education allows many older people to raise their living standard and enjoy a 
high quality of life and a long active phase, which accounts for some of the positive 
factors of the ageing process.  
China and Japan are among these “East Asian populations [which] have witnessed one 
of the most dramatic increases in the expectation of life in the world in the past 50 
years.” 134 In China the transition time of its population’s life expectancy was very short 
and rapid compared to the relatively long transition time of Japan resulting from the 
different historical and economic contexts.135 
While in China the newly issued health programme by the CCP in the 1950s quickly 
had an impact (medical insurance coverage of 85% in rural areas and 90% in urban 
areas by 1975136), the life expectancy of the Japanese population was already on the rise 
even before the country had started to encourage new health measures. However, with 
                                                
134 Zhao / Kinfu 2005: p.17 
135 cf. Zhao / Kinfu 2005: p.19 
136 cf. Banister / Hill 2004: p.67 
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economic growth, Japan also began to invest into health care services to be provided to 
the population.137  
Today Japan has the highest life expectancy worldwide with 80 for men and 86 for 
women and it is even rising further. China’s life expectancy still ranges lower with 72 
for men and 75 for women.138   
This assertion implies that better health conditions lead to a higher life expectancy (see 
figure 26) whereas it also reveals new health risks that come with age and that need to 
be responded to adequately. In other words, China and Japan on the one hand managed 
to raise life expectancy, but on the other hand both countries have long ignored the fact 
that non-communicable diseases such as strokes, heart attacks, diabetes, cancer, 
dementia etc. associated with old-age will need more governmental attention and 
official decision making. Furthermore, mental and emotional illnesses are also part of 
old age and need adequate responses; even if some of them may not be eliminated 
completely, their effects may be minimized. 139 
 
3.2.3 Inadequate social security and a new financial burden  
 
Another negative consequence of rapid ageing that needs to be analyzed is the challenge 
of a proper social security system and the financial burden it will entail. The lack of a 
reliable support system may exacerbate the burden on society and weaken its stability.  
Before the CCP came to power Chinese people relied mainly on kinship and family as a 
social network. In urban areas this began to change when the government with reference 
to the growing number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) introduced a social security 
system directed mainly at the population working in these companies and at the 
members of the bureaucracy, known as the iron rice bowl. Although it was only a basic 
system, it met the people’s needs.140 When the economy changed due to the Policy of 
Reform and Opening, social security was under pressure and the iron rice bowl was 
abolished in 1987. The changing situation, unfamiliar problems and the new lifestyle 
called for welfare reforms that would no longer hinder economic growth. Figure 35 
shows the rising number of pensioners within the past decades supporting the 
assumption that China has been facing a very rapid transition towards an ageing society 
which will have different needs the social security system will have to react to.   
 
                                                
137 cf. Sugiura et al. 2010: p.3 
138 cf. The World Bank Data  
139 cf. National Institute on Aging 2007: p.13 
140 cf. Leung 1994: p.342 
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The social security reform initiated in the 1990s introduced premium payments by individuals, and 
divided the responsibility of funding among three entities – companies, individuals, and the state. In 
addition, the reform seeks to eliminate local disparities by establishing a uniform system 
nationwide.141 
 
 
Figure 35: China: Number of Pensioners142 
 
In pre-modern Japan, social security was similar as in China, a communal concern 
without any intervention by the state. It was during the Second World War that the first 
rudiments of a social security network developed; however, at that time it was mainly 
an occupation-based system.143 The Japanese Constitution form 1946 stated in article 25 
that : “All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome 
and cultured living. [...] The State must make efforts to promote and expand social 
welfare, social security and public health services to cover every aspect of the life of the 
people.”144 
A great turn towards a modern social security network came in 1961 when a universal 
health insurance and pension system were introduced covering every Japanese citizen.  
Basic needs in Japan’s welfare system are currently covered by state funding (taxes), 
assisted by the insurance contribution every working member of society has to pay 
depending on his or her regular income.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
141 Sha 2007: p.39 
142 cf. United Nations Population Division 2010: p.23 
143 cf. Atoh 2000: p.2 
144 The Constitution of Japan 1946: Article 25 
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In response to the changes like the rapid ageing, the low fertility rate, the shrinking 
proportion of productive population and the special needs these problems will bring 
about new policies such as the Health Care System for the Elderly (1982) or the Long 
Term Care Insurance (2000) were introduced.145  
However, disparities are highly visible and the solutions for such extreme challenges are 
still limited. To get a deeper insight into the present situation and future outlook on the 
both countries’ social security developments, main changes will be analysed in more 
detail in chapter 3.4. 
 
                                                
145 cf. Gauld 2004: p.133 
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3.3 Confucian Values and the Challenges of Ageing and 
Caring  
 
So far the present demographic situation of China and Japan with reference to ageing 
has been analyzed and the main consequences that are going to derive from this 
population structure changes have been discussed. It became clear that there are several 
challenges that will have to be met in the future.  
In the chapter to come the question whether traditional values that were for a long time 
essential will be analyzed with regard to ageing and caring as well as the question 
whether these values still offer opportunities to respond adequately to the problematic 
situation of a rapidly ageing society will be dealt with.  
Do these traditional values still have the potential to overcome problems in times of 
modernization and the influx of western ideas as tools to reduce the pressure on society 
and on the government? Or will the future generations face a different way of life to that 
of their ancestors?   
Following a short introduction on the evolution of Confucianism, one of the most 
important cultural factors influencing the Chinese and to a slightly lower extent also the 
Japanese society, this chapter will concentrate on exploring the changes in household 
arrangements, family structures, marriage and newly evolving family patterns within the 
past decades and their evolution in accordance with the demographic transition and the 
process of ageing. The main focus will be on the shifts experienced by the old and 
oldest old population segment.  
 
3.3.1 Confucianism in China and Japan  
 
China 
 
Deriving from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Kong Fuzi or Kongzi (Master 
Kong), who lived from 551 until 478 BC, a collectivist based value system evolved 
which today is commonly referred to as Confucianism.146  
There is a broad variety of definitions trying to explain its nature and main content; 
often Confucianism is classified as a religion, sometimes as a philosophy or even as a 
political system. The teachings of Confucius and his followers such as Mencius, though, 
                                                
146 cf. Hoobler / Hoobler 2010: p.9 
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are predominantly defined as a traditional system of living, regulated by moral codes 
and a social order.147  
In pre-modern times Confucianism was a vital aspect of culture and everyday life, but 
even today Confucianism has millions of devotees in many countries 148, especially 
however in China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam, where people follow Confucian ideas. 
The main characteristics of this value system are a moral and social code influencing 
society and its various forms of relationships and the reliance on ethics, humanity, 
benevolence, sincerity and love, with the intention to establish harmony149 and to enable 
personal cultivation and to follow important rituals in everyday life.150  
 
Many in the world desire the same things Confucius sought: an orderly society; a balance between 
nature and humankind; and a way of conducting oneself with kindness, charity, honesty, and 
faithfulness. To people such as these Confucius is anything but outdated.151 
 
Confucianism was created in China and its values developed further throughout the 
dynasties while preserving its main essence. Confucian ideas experienced a downturn 
when the feudal system came under attack at the beginning of the 20th century and were 
even further reduced during the Maoist era when the influence of traditional values was 
seen as disadvantageous for the country’s economic development. When the CCP gave 
up trying to replace Confucianism by Maoism, Confucianism developed further under 
the influence of political developments and the coexistence of other systems of thought 
such as Buddhism and Daoism. It is an integral part of daily life which however differs 
from region to region.152 
 
Japan 
 
After the emergence and expansion of Confucianism in China it also swept over Japan 
in the sixth century via Korea. The teachings of Confucius were gradually introduced 
and adopted by the Japanese state in the following century as teachings of ethics and 
morality based on the principle of kinship, which similar to China, also partially 
penetrated the Japanese society.153  
                                                
147 cf. Yao 2000: p.4  
148 Note: Varying numbers exist due to different definitions  
     and different degree in allegiance.  
149 cf. Bell 2003: p.18  
150 cf. Chang 2010: p.108  
151 Hoobler / Hoobler 2010: p.137  
152 cf. Yao 2000: p. 
153 cf. Nakajima 2009: p.42 
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It was at that time, however, mainly interpreted as a foreign culture and an ideology 
rather than a philosophy like in China and therefore predominantly directed at the 
political realm and the upper classes and not at the entire population as it was in 
China.154 Its essence and influence on society in Japan therefore varied from that in 
China.  
During the Tokugawa Era (Edo 1603-1867) Confucianism in Japan experienced a vast 
transformation and an unprecedented high, which grew even further during the Meiji 
Restoration when Neo-Confucian expansion commenced and also began to percolate 
through society, promoting nationalistic attitudes especially when western influences 
began to exert growing pressure.155 156 
Loyalty, nationalism, social collectivism and the belief in authority can be seen as those 
Confucian values assisting Japan’s economic rise and its social transformation.157     
Although Confucianism was quite common in pre-modern Japan and also partially 
permeated Japan’s legislation, society was in these times also influenced by many other 
philosophies and religions such as Shintoism, Buddhism and Daoism. This mixture of 
various influences and local folk culture created a special combination of value systems 
and a unique Japanese culture differing from those in other countries of the region.158 
 
The Confucian influence […] has been modified to fit in with indigenous ideas, rather than being 
solely responsible for the Japanese ideology of hierarchy. It is a 'teaching', like Buddhism, so it is 
accorded status on that basis, but it is much more a moral or ethical system than a system of religious 
practice, and it has been drawn on to build and support the ethics of both Buddhism and Shinto.159  
 
Confucianism today 
 
The influence of Confucianism on human interaction declined starting in the 19th 
century when people began to view it more critically and state-driven suppression of 
traditional values took the upper hand.160 For some time Confucianism was seen as 
outdated in East Asia and the demand for reforms to adjust to the changing times 
resulted in the propagation of Neo-Confucianism.  
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Still it can be emphasized that certain traditional values from Confucian belief survived 
many wars, reforms, influences by other religions, political systems as well as strong 
criticism that evolved especially in Japan.  
Yet, its composition and significance transformed over the years and a revival of 
Confucianism in an adapted form has been underway since the mid to the late 20th 
century showing a new dynamism in many countries in East Asia and partially evolving 
in response to the rising western influence in the area.161  
In China the government began to loosen its control over religions and philosophies, 
temples were rebuilt and Confucian institutes were established also abroad; modern 
China seems to be on the way to revive Confucianism as an indispensable element of 
Chinese culture in the 21st century as well.  
Although people living in Japan rarely call themselves followers of Confucianism, 
certain Confucian values still exist in modern Japan enriching the country through its 
cultural heritage that still partially influences the social order.162 Daniel A. Bell even 
predicts a new trend furthering the revival of certain traditions and ideals.163 
 
We might rename this revitalized Confucianism “critical Confucianism”. With roots in the modern 
experiences of Confucianism in China and Japan, critical Confucianism would critique and open up a 
new space for discussion on morality and religion. It is therefore important to rethink prewar Japanese 
discourse on Confucianism and at the same time observe the current restoration of Confucianism in 
China.164 
 
It is often expected that the traditional values will decline, especially in China as the 
country wants to develop further and may see these traditional values as outdated and 
hindering.  
Concerning  the question of how Confucianism evolved over the decades it can be said 
that even though the traditional values, including the strong hierarchical structure and 
the classification by categories, are weaker than in previous centuries, there are still 
collective social norms that apply to the traditional family composition both in China 
and in Japan.  
 
Families imbued with Confucian values are perhaps still the single most important social institution in 
impairing ways of learning to be human in East Asian societies. Whether or not we are witnessing the 
revitalization of the Confucian family a sophisticated appreciation of East Asian culture past and 
present demands that we understand its psychocultural dynamics.165   
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As social security and health care provision for elderly is very much dependant on 
traditional values and on changes relating to family, household, and caring patterns, the 
following sections will analyse the most important characteristics of the present value 
system that will influence the composition of and the caring for the ageing populations 
in China and Japan.  
 
3.3.2 Aspects of ageing: Confucian influence and traditions  
 
3.3.2.1 Family structure and relations 
 
Despite discussions about the relevance of traditional values today, it remains 
unquestionable that family is a very important unit in the Chinese as well as the 
Japanese societies though to a varying extent.  
In relation to the discussion on demography and ageing in this paper, the Confucian 
social and moral code that strongly influenced and partly still influences family life 
today needs to be analysed since these societies will need to cope with a high 
percentage of old age people.  
When investigating societies in East Asia it rapidly becomes clear that the family was 
long seen as an institution regulated by a strong hierarchical structure determined by the 
five hierarchical relationships from ruler to ruled, father to son, husband to wife, elder 
brother to younger brother and friend to friend166 and the important values of loyalty 
and filial piety.167 
 
Confucian ideas were shared important foundations of everyday life in traditional China, Japan and 
Korea. Simultaneously, Confucian ideas emphasized manners in family, relationship in kinship 
structure, and the customary formalities of family.168 
 
Especially the social relationships between parents and their children are an integral part 
of defining the family centred social structure and its interaction procedures while 
having profound influence on demographic development and the caring system both in 
China and Japan. Social ties between blood-related family members and the security 
that is believed to be brought about with these ties can still be found in countries where 
people support socio-cultural ideals of Confucianism. Even before Confucianism 
expanded, the different roles in the family were already fixed and family coherence was 
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of utmost importance and also enforced by the state that transferred various tasks to the 
family. Confucian values later reinforced these basic concepts.169 170   
 
The Confucian family is gradually modifying and adapting itself to an increasingly egalitarian 
perspective […] However the substance of Confucianism, particularly in terms of interpersonal 
relationships and ethical values, is still alive and flourishing.171 
 
Hierarchy 
 
 
Traditionally the head of family in societies that are influenced by Confucian values 
was determined by male dominance and the rule of seniority. All members had to show 
full obedience and follow the decisions taken by the head of the family as they were 
economically dependent and had no possessions of their own. Women were always 
subordinate through the three rules of obedience towards father, husband and son.172 
These rules found expression in every aspect of family life.  
This points out that in China heritage and lineage is an important issue as family 
members were born into their position, which automatically granted them certain rights 
and defined their duties.173   
On the other hand in Japan, the kinship and heritage regulations were not so strict. After 
the death of the head of family, the successor was not pre-determined by birth or chosen 
by bloodline but by analysing the relationships within the group. Therefore the adoption 
of a son was a popular procedure in Japan while this was a taboo in China where over 
the years the heir had to prove his ability.174 With regard to the family possessions, the 
most common practice in Japan was for the eldest son to take over the leading role in 
contrast to China where each of the sons inherited part of the possessions.175  
Age was also a fundamental factor having an impact on the composition of families and 
on the societal structure. It is noteworthy that seniority was an aspect that affects the 
extent of respect that was shown towards the hierarchical superior, as great wisdom was 
related to age that was needed to maintain stability and harmony.176  
However, in the past decades the Confucian family system has been influenced by 
modernization, urbanisation and industrialisation and criticism leading to a reduction of 
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hierarchical power.  It can be observed that these transformations were additionally 
accompanied by changing patterns of child-rearing and socialization and shifting 
practices in relation to obedience.177  
 
Filial Piety  
 
The second main characteristic that is essential to examine when looking at the 
Confucian family tradition in relation to demographic change and ageing is filial piety 
(xiao). It describes the strong bond between the parents and their children regulated by 
obedience, respect and loyalty which continues even after the death of the parents. 
Leaving one`s parents was considered as a serious violation act against filial piety, as 
this would amount to denouncing one’s own parents.178  
 
Filial piety was supreme beyond any other social or political aspirations or obligations. The true 
practice of filial piety required giving up one’s physical well-being, material interests, public 
obligations, and political ambitions when such sacrifices were required in order to serve one's 
parents.179 
 
For a long time filial piety was seen as central in both countries, China and Japan. 
Nevertheless, when it passed over from China to Japan, filial piety was adopted into a 
different social network whose main difference was the kind of kinship.180 Although 
Japanese culture is also strongly based on values such as harmony and collectivism, for 
a long time not the immediate family was the foremost sphere of attention but it was 
expanded to people also interconnected by clan, neighbourhood and other external 
relations. Filial piety in Japan therefore was performed not as meticulously and not only 
towards the parents but also within the whole kinship framework distinguished by 
economic status and territorial affiliation.  
The Chinese kinship structure, on the other hand, is defined by the connections within 
the kinship rather than to the outside, and especially by the father-son relationship 
which is characterised by the son’s obedience during the father’s life and even after 
death and support provided by the father to the son. At an earlier time in China a special 
kind of filial piety was additionally directed towards the emperor, which was likewise 
connected to various duties.181  
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Since the beginning of the 20th century ciritque rose with regard to Confucianism 
especially concerning the long practiced filial piety. The CCP tried to abolish these 
principles and replace them by socialist family norms and attempted to rediret this 
loyality that was directed at the family towards the nation and the party. 
 
A comprehensive set of institutions was set up to indoctrinate the younger generation into a new set 
of values. Central to those instituitions was an effort to persuade younger people that loyality to the 
nation, the CPC, and to Mao should come before loyality to one's own family […] the prolonged 
seperations and disruption of family lives continued for many families until after Mao's death in 
1976.182  
  
As after Mao one returned to a kind of ambivalent tolerance of Confucianism also filial 
piety could gain strength again.183 Following the principle of filial piety the PRC 
introduced the so called Law of the People`s Republic of China on the Protection of the 
Rights and Interests of the Elderly. It became a binding regulation in October 1996 and 
pinpoints the necessity of children to care for and look after their parents but also 
support them by financial means (alimony payments) if personal assistance is not 
possible. If children refrain from following these regulations a lawsuit may be brought 
to a People`s court. 184 The problem young adults with regard to their obligation to care 
for their parents face today is the 4-2-1 family structure where four grandparents and 
two parents rely on the youngest generation for support. 
Additionally the situation of filial piety is changing and household division trends are 
found more frequently, especially in rural areas in China due to rural to urban migration 
as well as in Japan. Although the main ideals of filial piety are upheld, the way of 
maintaining these values are changing.185 The change is gradual and there are 
indications that “mutual affection rather than one-way obedience” 186 is becoming the 
dominant practice.  
 
In both Chinese and Japanese societies, Confucian principles of filial piety have been used recurrently 
in history as a basis of social order, spiritual anchoring, moral conduct, and social control. At the 
same time, filial piety today is not merely a historical vestige of the "traditional" family, but an 
ongoing practice of belonging, security and surveillance.187  
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Besides filial piety, the special hierarchical system and other traditional values influence 
family life and care giving in China and Japan. The extent of their potential to influence 
the social system and caring for the aged within the Japanese and Chinese society will 
be analysed in the following sections.  
It is crucial to find out more about the level of importance these attitudes still have in 
society to estimate their capability in a phase of rapid ageing. How households and 
family patterns of the old and oldest old will change and where traditional values lose 
their stance is going to be vital for future generations and social security planning.  
 
3.3.2.2   Household composition and family living arrangements 
 
An important aspect when analysing the structure of a society and predicting its future 
development is to look at the predominant living arrangements typical for a country or 
region.  
 
Living arrangements of the elderly are a key determinant of their needs for socio-economic, physical 
and psychic assistance, and household projections are therefore critical to understanding challenges in 
this area.188  
 
In both China and Japan it was not the population structure alone that experienced a 
transition in the past centuries, also the family and the household as a unit were 
gradually transformed due to various internal and external influences. The greatest 
changes can be seen in urban Japan while in China the evolution in rural and urban 
areas differs.189  
Early household division is a process leading to a gradual decrease in large and 
multigenerational households. Its structural changes, which have been especially 
dynamic since the 1970s, resulted in the creation of more and smaller households.190  
As reasons for this trend the changing intergenerational dynamics and family customs, a 
weakening of intergenerational relationships and less attraction towards the parental 
households can be distinguished. The main characteristics of Confucianism, filial piety 
and the hierarchical patterns were under pressure and began to change their form and 
adapt to the new situation deriving from socio-economic developments such as 
globalization, modernization and the move towards a market economy but also political 
changes. Still, compared to other regions in the world East Asia and especially countries 
influenced by Confucian values show a continuing tendency of maintaining strong ties 
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to their relatives and exchanging support whenever necessary. Children are still being 
taught the importance of respect towards the elderly by their parents so that, when the 
time comes, they will be prepared to support them.191   
 
In China, both generations still see the family as central to the operation of society and expect to rely 
on their children for care and support in old age. Some of the same generational similarities and 
differences are evident in Japan, [studies however indicate] that the status of Japanese elders has 
diminished.192 
 
China 
 
China, for many years a traditionally agrarian society, was for over two thousand years 
dominated by the ideal of an extended multigenerational family (jia) (round family= 
five-generation household193), determined by cultural as well as economic factors. 
Grandparents, parents, their children and other relatives such as married brothers of the 
head of family and their own families lived together as a large unit regulated by the 
Confucian relationship rules and strong support for one another.194 The desire to form 
an entity was very strong, although the ideal form was rarely reached.   
Since the head of the family had full control over the members of the household, their 
possessions and incomes, other members of the family were obliged to follow the 
head’s instructions. This attitude of furthering family unity across many generations 
was a very Confucian one.  
In the 20th century, however, family patterns began to change due to new political and 
economical influences, most notably after the People’s Republic was created in 1949 
and even further during the Cultural Revolution when tradition was harshly attacked by 
the state.195  “In the Maoist era, the attack on ancestor worship and lineage organization 
struck directly at the cultural and religious core of the extended family.” 196  
Since the 1940s only in the areas under CCP control and in the 1950s in whole China 
state reforms have led to a new more egalitarian social order, the collectivization of the 
economy and the formation of communes; land was no longer owned by the patriarch, 
but by the commune. Additionally, new laws concerning civil rights, marriage and 
extended population policies were introduced giving more attention to the individual 
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and no longer to the lineage or household.197 Simultaneously, younger generations 
became more and more socio-economically independent.  
These impacts were first felt in urban areas while extended family traditions were 
maintained longer among the peasantry in rural areas.198  
 
In light of the deeply rooted traditional Chinese ideology favoring large families, such remarkable 
changes in family structure could only have been precipitated by significant socioeconomic changes. In 
prerevolutionary times, well-to-do Chinese made every effort to sustain large multigeneration families 
so as to safeguard the land and property they had accumulated over generations.199 
 
Statistics illustrate the decline of the average size of the Chinese household from 5.21 in 
1931 to 4.3 in 1953 reflecting the continuous trend away from the extended household 
towards smaller household units, which, as can be seen in figure 36, is the dominant size 
of a Chinese household today.200 The data (see figure 37) for the year 1982 shows the 
dominance of 4 and 5 person households while figure 36 illustrates the present average 
household size of around 3 in urban and 3.6 in rural areas.   
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Figure 36: China: household members (urban/rural) 1985-2007201 
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Figure 37: China: Household size (%) 1982 202 
 
In recent years a new trend has evolved showing the augmentation of two and single-
person households. This can be mainly traced back to the reduced number of children 
that are being born and to the postponement of marriage. However still the percentage 
of more generation households remains high.  
For example, a government population census in villages in the North of China revealed 
that while only 2.4 percent lived alone in 1982 already 6.4 percent lived in single 
households in 1993. Between 1982 and 1993 the percentage of nuclear families rose 
from 60.2 percent to 68.2 percent.203 These numbers also reflect the strong internal 
migration occurring in China especially from rural to urban areas for educational or 
occupational reasons, leading to smaller households in rural areas. The separation of 
households does however not automatically mean that children reduce their support for 
their relatives but that the ways of support are changing. Additionally in the past years 
return-migration is becoming more popular again especially due to high living costs in 
urban areas and family responsibilities that exert a strong pull. However migration 
towards big cities is still holds the upper hand.  
 
They may also return if parents or other relatives become less able to manage the family holding or 
need health and personal care, or simply to resume contact with their children and other family 
members. On the other hand, some of those who have migrated may come to see the city as the place 
which offers the greater opportunities for themselves and their growing children, who may join them 
to seek secondary education.204  
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Taking the already mentioned steady decrease of household size in China into account it 
can be assumed that in the following decades it will decline even further towards the 
nuclear family with 2 parents and one child. Also many single households are going to 
be created due to evolving modern attitudes towards cohabitation and marriage. 
Estimates predict an average household size of 2.67 in 2050 (see figure 38).  
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with one-couple and child(ren) without elderly parents living together will 
decrease from 51.8% in 2000 to 34.6% in 2030 and 27.7% in 2050, 
respectively. The share of the one-couple-only h ouseholds a nd t he 
households of one-single-parent and child(ren) without elderly parents living 
together will somewhat increase in the period 2000-2030 and then decline 
considerably thereafter. The overall percentage of the households without 
elders aged 65+ will decrease from 76.0% in 2000 to 68.8% and 55.7% in 
2030 and 2050, a s ubstantial d ecrease, r espectively ( see Table 2). The 
substantial decrease in the percentage of young or relatively young 
households (  those households without an elder member(s) aged 65+) and 
the dramatic increase in elderly households,  clearly indicate that Chinese 
family households will be aging rapidly and substantially in the next a few 
decades.  
 
 
By the year 2030 and 2050, the rural-urban combined proportion of 
elderly aged 65 and above living in empty-nest households without children 
living together among the total population will be 2.9 and 4.6 times of that 
in 2000, under the medium fertility and mortali ty assumptions. The increase 
in  percentages   of the  oldest -old  aged 80+  living in  empty-nest  households  
 
Figure 38: China Household size, medium assumpt on 2000 -2050205 
 
Numerous reasons for devel pments towards a greater variety of household forms may 
be observed. Whil  in w stern societi s the permanent departure from the household by 
children around a certain age, normally around the e d f schooling, is widely practised 
and also accepted, in countries such as China, traditional boundaries reduce the 
tendency of Chinese children to move out of their childhood homes as long as they are 
not married. Even after marriage, cohabitation in a multigenerational household is still 
common, especially in regions where housing prices are high and cohabitation is 
maintained for financial reasons.  
In relation to economic development and traditional consciousness, various reasons for 
leaving the household may be distinguished. While in urban areas moving out of the 
parents’ household is at present primarily voluntary and often even postponed due to 
high living costs, young people in rural areas often see no other chance than to leave 
their home town in the poorer areas of China to support their family by working in the 
bigger cities. Another factor pulling especially young men away from rural areas is the 
lack of women that derives from the long practiced one child policy and the son 
preference.206   
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A further reason contributing to the change in family and household composition is the 
attitude towards the leaving of the child. Compared to other countries where both 
parties see this event as predominantly positive due to the greater independence that is 
expected by both parents and children, in China it often has negative associations. 
Moving out of the parents’ home was only seen as a positive event when a woman 
married and moved to her new husband`s home. In other cases leaving the parents in the 
so-called empty nest was a very negative act and seen as a loss of parental respect, 
undermining the traditional family support system.207  
 
Among the paths to filial piety in every day life, maintaining a multigenerational large household was 
one of the most important. Indeed, partitioning the parental household was socially disapproved of 
and was considered notoriously unfilial.208  
 
Owing to the changing lifestyle brought about by modernization, elderly care capacities 
are reduced due to the continuing household separation. Social security cannot keep up 
with these rapid developments and so the elderly of the decades to come will face a 
great threat.209  
 
Empty nests threaten the viability of the traditional way of caring for older Chinese. As a result, the 
traditional pattern of family support as a way of caring for the older Chinese is weakened and will not 
meet the needs of the booming old population in the upcoming decades.210  
 
Today a certain pressure by social values but also by the legal obligation to care for 
ones parents is still exerted on the young adults today. This is one of the reasons for 
them to remain in a multigenerational household for a longer period or even forever.211  
In the past decades, however, not only did household size change rapidly, but parallel to 
changes in family size, household age composition also evolved and poses new 
challenges for many societies today. Ageing and changes in lifestyle influence the new 
appearance of households leading to new ways of cohabitation and dependencies. At 
present most elderly in China are found living in households that are still made up of 
more generations and only few live in smaller unit households or alone.(see figure 40) 
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China is [a] country where extended family living is more prevalent than it is in the West, despite all 
the changes of recent decades. The most distinctive feature of Chinese family structure concerns the 
preference for elderly people to live with one of their children.212 
 
Predictions based on the medium fertility and medium mortality assumption of the PRC 
suggest that the number of households with at least one elderly will increase from 24 
percent to over 44 percent until 2050. While in 2000 only 18 percent were 
multigenerational households this number is expected to rise to over 26 percent by 
2050.213  
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Figure 40: China: Household with elderly (%) 2000-2050214   
 
This analysis reveals that the number of multigenerational households will remain high 
throughout the coming decades on the one hand due to the rising proportion of elderly 
(see figure 41) on the other hand however also due to the tendency of young adults to 
remain in their parents household resulting from the tight knit family network and 
traditional values that are still rooted in society.  
 
                                                
212 Cheal 2008: p. 124 
213 Yi et al. 2008: p.22 
214 Yi et al. 2008: p.22 
63  
China: Household with and without elderly
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Figure 41: China: Household with and without elderly (%) 2000-2050 215 
 
What needs to be kept in mind is that the decreasing number of children due to the 
declining birth rate will however have a negative impact on the possibility for an elderly 
to co-reside with his family leading to a spreading of the empty-nest phenomenon. As 
long as the state does not provide adequate care and nursing facilities, single elderly 
people will have to cope living alone.   
 
The rates of institutionalized care in many East Asian societies are significantly lower than in 
Western nations. The major reason for the disparity is largely due to the cultural emphasis on the 
practice of filial piety in most East Asian societies, where frail parents are cared for by their children. 
(…) Currently, the proportion institutionalized among the population aged 65 and over is less than 2 
per cent and is only 1 per cent among the oldest-old (aged 80 and over) in China.216  
 
These elderly who lack the chance of receiving family care will face new situations and 
will have to cope living alone or with their partner. This phenomenon is already found 
more frequently in remote areas due to the rural to urban migration.  
 
Rural China is yet to face the impact of the one-child policy, which will substantially reduce the 
number of children available to share support duty in the next few decades. The unprecedented flow 
of rural-to-urban migration of the young generation has already created a geographical separation 
of adult children from their parents and thus may limit children's capacity to fulfil their filial 
duties.217 
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If, however, living together with their adult children is possible, cohabitation with a 
married couple and their child or children will be the dominating form. The forecasts 
clearly show that as household composition changes percentage-wise, the overall 
number of households with at least one elderly will continue to rise as a result of the 
rising proportion of elderly218. 
 
Japan 
 
In Japan the patriarchal founding family (ie) is the traditional family model. Compared 
to the Chinese family the Japanese one is characterised by the fact that only one son 
inherited the household and succeeded the former head of the family while his brothers 
missed out; women on the other hand, generally held a lower position than men. Even 
though living together as a multiple generation family in the past was long seen as the 
ideal household structure, this model was even then not penetrating all areas and 
“classes”.219  
In modern times, however, the Japanese household composition has rapidly changed, 
influenced by various factors that correlate with modern lifestyle, leading to a steady 
decline in household size as can be seen in figures 42 and 43. 
In particular the number of three- and two-person households has risen significantly in 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Since 2007 one-person households are taking over 
a very important role while households including more than five people and multiple 
generation households, which still dominated until 1955, are becoming a rare 
occurrence.220 (see figure 42)  
 
Figure 42: Japan household members 1920-2002 (8/10/1/2 members)221 
                                                
218 cf. Yi et al. 2008: p.22 
219 cf. Formanek 2007: p.190 et sequ. 
220 cf. Yoshio 2002: p.185 
221 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau 
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Household changes such as the increasing propensity among the elderly to live alone, 
the growth in the number of one-parent family households, and the rising tendency of 
young adults to stay longer in their parental households, are of great concern for the 
future security of the Japanese society.   
The remaining of young adults within the parental household results mainly from the 
longer educational phase due to new possibilities opening up especially for women due 
to modernization, but also from the resulting marriage delay. Of course rising living 
costs are also a factor attaching the young adults to their home.222  
 
Schooling, employment, and marriage are major life events corresponding to the 
occurrences of leaving home in Japan. The timings, occurrences, and proximities of these 
life events and nest-leaving strongly affect the levels and timing of leaving home within 
each cohort.223  
 
Another factor that becomes more relevant in Japan these days is the necessity for 
parents who both are integrated into working life to find an affordable way for their 
children to be looked after. There the “extended family still fits well into modern 
aspects of family life in Japanese society, where housing is expensive and public 
supports for childcare are scarce.”224  
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Figure 43: Japan: average household members 1970-2005 225 
 
Figure 43 shows the household size reduction trend which is very likely to continue 
even further in the future and will lead to significant impacts on the society as a whole 
and its future development.  
                                                
222 cf. Fukuda 2010: p.2 et sequ. 
223 Fukuda 2010: p.9 
224 Fukuda 2010: p.7 
225 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau  
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The total number of households has been increasing as it can be seen in figure 44. 
However while nuclear and one-person households have rise the number of three-
generation households has remained about the same as over 40 years ago. This is a very 
special development for a highly developed country as Japan.  The eralier mentioned 
increasing number of young adults remaining in their parents home can be distinguished 
as part of the nuclear households.  
 
 
 
Figure 44: Japan: changes in household composition 1974-2009226  
 
Further projections indicate that the main changes taking place in household size relate 
to greater independence and more autonomy paralleled by changes in overall and long-
practiced values. Less and less attention is given to activities within the household 
network as the terms alternative lifestyles and individual choices of life are used more 
frequently. Furthermore, a broader diversity in the ways family life is being practised 
will evolve.227  
In relation to the ageing process, households in Japan also tend to consist of more and 
more elderly. Figures 45 and 46 show clearly the rapid rise of households of the aged 
since the 1980s compared to the overall increase of households. However, not only the 
total number increases but also the forms of households elderly live in are changing.   
 
 
                                                
226 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau  
227 cf. Yoshio 2002: p.185 
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Figure 45: Japan: Households (total)228 229 
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Figure 46: Japan: Households (aged) 230 231 
 
Although this cannot be seen distinctly in the age group above 70, as former generations 
still followed traditional values more strictly, those below this age face new situations in 
relation to their living situation. On the other hand elderly above the age of 80 may no 
longer live without receiving help from others.   
What becomes evident when looking at the age structure of households in Japan is the 
rising number of elderly that live alone or only with their spouse and no longer within a 
big family network. This percentage rose extremely rapidly in the past decades while 
the number of elderly living in a multi-generational household dropped from 77 percent 
in 1970 to 52 percent in 1997.232  
The number of households consisting of 3 generations already decreased starting in 
1985 and was already comparably low in 2000 while 2 generation households are 
increasing.(see figure 47)  
                                                
228 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau 
229 cf. United Nations 2001/2002 
230 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau 
231 cf. United Nations 2001/2002 
232 cf. Jones 2007/1: p.83 
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Figure 47: Japan: Elderly household types 1970-2000233  
 
It can be assumed that the new chances for young people due to modernization such as 
new education possibilities and the evolution from an agrarian and subsistence society 
to an industrialised society are the main reasons for this separation of generations.  
The desire for young people to become independent plays another key role in this 
process. Further factors such as the value of marriage and the new self-confidence of 
women add to these changes.234  
What also becomes evident when analysing households in Japan is that separated 
households of the elderly are mainly found in better income families. This trend reveals 
another characteristic of traditional multigenerational families – the sharing of a 
household in order to pool the resources of its members. Today this approach can also 
be found with increasing frequency in low income families.235 
At the same time, the proportion of adults above the age of 50 who have a child above 
18 is steadily decreasing, correlating with the overall decreasing number of children and 
leading to the already mentioned lack of caregivers.236  
                                                
233 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau  
234 cf. Retherford et al 2001: p.65 et sequ.  
235 cf. Nishioka 2000: p.222 
236 cf. Nishioka 2000: p.240 
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3.3.2.3 Marriage and traditional family patterns 
 
Marriage, divorce and the female position in society are additional important factors 
determining the development of a population and its composition and are also 
influenced by modernization and state policies on population intervention.  
Marriage in both China and Japan is an important issue and strongly influences 
demographic composition and the situation old age people are and will be facing in the 
future. Previously there was no other way of leaving one`s family than by getting 
married, and even then in countries such as China and Japan leaving the parents’ 
household was often postponed and more generations remained living under one roof. 
Most marriages were arranged by the parents or family elders, often long before the 
children even reached the age of marriage.  
The mindset that marriage is something universal, permanent and necessary to maintain 
the natural order put forward by traditional values such as Confucianism was 
unquestioned in China and Japan for a long time.237 The belief that every woman and 
man should be married continues to be a very dominant one.  
What, however, is striking in China as well as in Japan, is the rapid change in the 
marriage age as interest in marriage in early adulthood is declining and due to the 
changing position of women in society, new job opportunities and better education 
possibilities are becoming more attractive.238 These changes result in a lack of 
caregivers, who traditionally were women within the family, and require alternatives if 
the growing elderly population is to be cared for.  
 
China 
 
As mentioned earlier, China has a long and deep-rooted tradition of marriage and 
especially early marriage (zaohun). However, when the government began to establish 
family planning programmes, it also tried to influence population composition and size 
by regulating marriage and predominantly marriage age, which until the mid 20th 
century was relatively low at about 14 years for women and 16 years for men.239  
It was believed that later marriage would lead to later childbearing and therefore to a 
shrinking population. While the freedom of marriage and the free choice of partners was 
already defined in the first marriage law in 1950, the second marriage law in 1980 had 
ten amendments of which a major was the enforcement of the delay of marriage and 
                                                
237 cf. Engel 1984: p.955 
238 cf. Suzuki 2001: p.23   
239 cf.  Zhang 1991 
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childbirth by raising the legal marriage age to 20 years for women and 22 years for men.  
Even if arranged and earlier marriages still existed during that time and continued to 
this day, predominantly in remote areas, the increase of the legal marriage age was an 
innovation that fitted Chinas modernisation movement.240  
What further increased marriage age were new living arrangements that evolved as the 
strong patriarchal pressure was reduced, education possibilities augmented and women 
began to experience more autonomy.241 Figure 48 shows the rapid drop in the early 
marriage of young men and women between the ages of 15 and 19 within the short 
period of only 10 years. 
 
 
China: Early Marriage Rate
0
1
2
3
4
5
1990 2000
female male
 
Figure 48: Early marriage of population aged 15-19 (%)242 
 
While late and non-marriage was seen as an aberration in the past, the divorce numbers 
today show a steady increase, putting further pressure on the family centred traditional 
caring system. (see figure 49) 
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Figure 49: China: Divorce rate 1978-2007243 
                                                
240 cf. Banister 1991: p.159 
241 cf. Suzuki 2001: p.24 et sequ.  
242 cf. National Bureau of Statistics 2004 
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It is widely recognized in the region that the rise in female non-marriage represents a major break 
with the past, and that it poses challenges to traditional culture, to relationships within the family, and 
to official policy.244 
 
The marriage rate is further reduced by the lack of women due to the one child policy 
and the infanticide of girls due to the son preference that has been practiced for decades 
and now shows its devastating results. It is becoming harder and harder for men to find 
a woman to marry especially in remote areas due to increasing urbanisation and gender 
imbalance.245     
 
Japan 
 
Similarly to China, Japan is also experiencing new marriage trends. The time span of 
young people residing with older generations is getting shorter while first marriage age 
is being delayed, so although the younger generations are moving out earlier, most of 
them do not do so by getting married.  
While in 1975 the average marriage age for women was 24 years, it increased to 28 
years by 1995 and for men from 28 to 31 (see figure 50) while the percentage of 
arranged marriages fell from 64 percent to 7 percent between 1955 and 1998.246   
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Figure 50: Japan: Mean Marriage Age1950-2008247  
 
The Japanese government has been increasingly concerned about the trends toward late marriage and 
less marriage, especially because these trends are a major cause contributing to Japan’s very low 
fertility.248  
 
                                                                                                                                          
243 cf. National Bureau of Statistics 2003/2008  
244 Jones 1997: p.64 
245 cf. England 2005: p. 24 et sequ.  
246 cf. East-West Center 2002: p.32 et sequ. 
247 East-West Center 2002: p.32 et sequ.  
248 cf. East-West Center 2002: p.34 
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The activities initiated by the government to reverse this trend to avoid further 
shortcomings in the social security system and to reduce the costs rapid ageing would 
bring about appear very ineffectual as the number of unmarried men and women is 
continuously rising similar to the divorce rate. In China this rate is still lagging behind 
as it has long been considered as a taboo to get divorced.249  
Figure 51 shows a continuous drop in the number of marriages since a peak in 1970 
while the number of divorces is rising steadily in the past decades.   
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Figure 51: Japan: Marriages and Divorces (1947-2000)250 
 
It can be assumed that in Japan the rapid development and its consequent influences on 
population and social life such as new educational possibilities, the decline in arranged 
marriages, the longing for more freedom and the search for happiness and emotional 
fulfilment within a marriage were factors influencing the drop in the marriage rate and 
the rise in the marriage age. 251 Even though marriage is often seen as offering few gains 
and rather hindering career advancement leading to a delay in marriage (bankonka)252, 
Japan “compared to some industrialized countries in the west […] can still be regarded 
as a ‘kaikon shakai’ where marriage is the norm”253 and one can find little avoidance of 
marriage.  
 
                                                
249 cf. Clesse 2004: p.91 et sequ. 
250 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau 
251 cf. Fukuda 2009: p.1 et sequ.  
252 cf. Tokuhiro 2010: p.2 
253 Tokuhiro 2010: p.23 
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3.4 Social Security Reforms, Health and Family Care   
 
Factors of demographic transition and ageing, mentioned earlier, give us a vision of 
how various changes in past decades will influence the future development of East 
Asian demography and show unquestionably the necessity of a reliable and flexible 
social security system that can prevent tensions and civil unrest from arising in the 
future. The Global Ageing Index (GAP) predicts that the amount of public benefits for 
the ageing society will be immense as will be the burden it will pose. China is expected 
to need 8 percent of its GDP in 2040 to support the elderly, while Japan is predicted to 
need 18.4 percent of its GDP. The GAP also points out that today 25 percent of the 
elderly in China and 22 percent in Japan already live in poverty.254 
In order to assess the extent to which social security and health care will have to adapt 
in the upcoming decades and to measure the influence traditional values still have in 
China and Japan, the social security systems of the two countries will be analysed in 
this chapter and future prospects for dealing with the ageing societies will be pointed 
out.  
 
China 
 
All around the world many countries still lack an efficient and universal social security 
system and this lack will pose a burden for the ageing societies in the future.  
It is recognisable that in China the establishment of support and care that is taken over 
by the state is still weak and therefore other mechanisms have evolved trying to step in 
to reduce some of the rising pressure. As a result, more and more non-profit 
organisations and private social care facilities have been launched in the past few years 
to meet the continuously rising need for assistance.255 These private initiatives and civil 
organisations on the one hand offer services the government may not provide and lead 
to higher competitiveness thereby improving the quality of such institutions. On the 
other hand they lead to high costs for the people who lack sufficient financial means or 
family support to afford private social care.   
During the times when social security was not a topic of state concern, China’s support 
for the elderly was mainly guaranteed by ones relatives and support was mainly a 
responsibility of the adult children attached to their parents by filial piety.  
 
                                                
254 cf. Global Ageing Index 2010 
255 cf. Cai / Wang 2006: p.623 et sequ. 
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For a long time children in China were raised with the understanding that they would 
guarantee the livelihood of their parents in the years to come. This reduced the states 
responsibility as it was passed on to the society. Therefore the state did not feel the need 
to actively support care of old people.  
 
Traditional patterns of parent care have been widely attributed to the deeply rooted cultural belief of 
xiao, or filial piety, which has been long believed to be the essential element holding together the 
Chinese familial system of care, determining who is likely to be a care provider, and deciding the 
types and amount of care that are provided.256  
 
However, due to various changes in the last decades and the family planning 
mechanisms that were implemented, the badly organised state institutions came under 
pressure but still have not adapted adequately to the new situation they face. 257 Fewer 
and fewer adult children are able to care for their parents who often live far away in the 
countryside, and even if support is provided, the 4-2-1 family pattern that has evolved 
leaving one child supporting two parents and four grandparents as well as rising life 
expectancy have made it impossible to maintain the traditional support system of pre-
modern times.  
In the 1980s, China even tried to revive the traditional caring system by introducing the 
so-called “Family Support Agreement” (FSA) which would guarantee the support of 
parents by their children by signing a contract. This contract could be signed on a 
voluntary basis; if broken, however, penalty payments had to be paid. In 2005 over 13 
million Chinese in the rural areas had signed these contracts.258 This shows that family 
support is still seen as an important issue yet based on an inadequate social security 
system.  
Seeing these changes that underline the need for a stable social security support and 
elderly care system financed and run by the state, it becomes clear that the government 
will be confronted with a great challenge in the future. 
In 2005 China had to admit that the reforms of the past decades had lead to no vital 
improvements in the field of social security offered to the people. However the 
government waited until 2009 to undertake the next reforms with ageing identified as 
one of the priorities.  
 
 
                                                
256 Zhan / Montgomery 2003: p.210 
257 cf. Zhan / Montgomery 2003: p.209 et sequ. 
258 cf. Chou 2011: p.4 et sequ.  
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The first great step was taken in social security in the PRC came in 2010 when the plan 
for a new Social Insurance Law (SIL) was announced and then implemented in July 
2011 as basic insurance for all employees in the PRC. This system requires every 
employee within the PRC to take part in 5 main insurance schemes for pensions, health 
care, injuries related to work, unemployment and maternity leave.259 The first three 
contribution payments need to be paid for by both employer and employee, the latter 
ones are only funded by the employer.260 This law has a main aim of introducing 
pension and medical care insurance for rural and urban residents by introducing new 
systems for those who until then have not been part of the former systems (article 20, 24 
and 25261) . 
One of the main problems which did not vanish with the introduction of this law is the 
lack of uniformity; the contributions that have to be paid still vary from region to region 
and also in urban and rural areas and the coordination of four pension sub plans and 
three medical sub plans reveal additional difficulties.262  
It is, however, too early to measure the positive or negative influence these changes of 
legislation will have on the social security network over the long term, especially in 
relation to affordability, transparency and funding.  
 
Pension System  
 
The first national pension system was introduced in China in the 1950s as a Pay-As-
You-Go system which disintegrated during the time of the Cultural Revolution. Since 
then the Chinese pension system presented itself as a very fragmented one and could not 
be unified during the following decades.  
 
The All China Federation of Trade Unions managed the system until 1966. After the abolition of this 
federation during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), supervisory responsibility was then 
transferred to the local labour bureaus,while the task of distributing benefits was passed on to SOEs. 
As a consequence of the Cultural Revolution, limited administrative capacity prevented the Chinese 
state from managing a coherent and centrally regulated public pension system. Considering the high 
level of fragmentation prevailing both at the administrative and the provision levels, the central state, 
through, its different ministries, only issued general orders from time to time.263 
 
 
 
                                                
259 cf. Ligorner et al. 2011 
260 cf. Siu / Sun 2011 
261 cf. National Peoples Congress 2010  
262 cf. Wang 2011  
263 Beland / Ka 2004: p.273 
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In 1998 however a new system was introduced that after a long time brought about 
noticable changes that were not accomplished before. This system that is still in use 
today was however transformed in 2006 in an effort of trying to create a scheme that 
would cover the whole population, which is a difficult task with over 774.8 million 
(2008) employed in this big country.264  
The Chinese pension system is spilt into two main sections, the basic pension and 
individual accounts. The first is paid by the employer, the second by the employee. 
Additonally, there are supplementary plans that can be used by big employers.265 Within 
this system the normal pension age for men is 60 and for women 50.266 
Even though since 2009 the number of people covered by the government's pensions 
has risen tremendously there is lots of room for improvents with regard to the 
broadening of the coverage of the national pension system even further especially in the 
rural areas. “Today only 55% of employees in urban areas are covered and most of the 
rural popluation are not covered at all.”267 There are initiatives that in conjunction with 
the rebuilding of new socialist villages try to innitiate a pension system also in rural 
areas. If the coverage extends the problem still remains that the basic pension payments 
are very low particularly in rural areas and state pensions still have to be supplemented 
by the pensioners by individual contributions, mandatory contributions are high while 
the management of the funds is decentralized and fragmented.268  
  
Health Care System  
 
Until the 1970s and 1980s China’s health care system was financed by the government 
and was then rather stable. It was made up of three main pillars – a cooperative system 
in rural areas, the government insurance system and the labor insurance system. The 
latter two covered almost 100 percent of the urban population and 85 percent of the 
rural population in 1975.269 
However, during the time of decentralization and privatization, financial means were 
reduced and the old system collapsed while privatization was on the move. This led to 
strong protests in the population against the government’s focus on economic issues and 
the rising lack of health care in vast areas.270  
 
                                                
264 cf. National Bureau of Statistics Japan 
265 cf. Jiang 2011: p.3 
266 cf. OECD 2011: p.332 
267 Oksanen 2010: p.8 
268 cf. Chen / Liu 2009: p. 167 et sequ.  
269 cf. Chu / Rask 2001: p.2 
270 cf. Ho 2011: p.2 
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After a decade and a half of economic reform, the central government’s role in financing healthcare 
diminished to half of what it used to be; patient out-of-pocket payments more than doubled as a share 
of national health expenditures; and the rural cooperative medical system virtually ceased to exist.271 
 
As a result, the private health care sector rose from 36 percent to 68 percent between 
1980 and 2002  while government support dropped from 32 percent to 15 percent from 
1978 to 2002, which makes the extent of change clear. During this time, only 10 percent 
of the rural and 50 percent of urban populations were covered by the health care 
scheme.272  
One of the first steps to improve health care again was the Implementation Plan for 
Deepening Pharmaceutical and Health System Reform 2009-2011. Huge sums were 
said to be invested into this plan with the goal of making progress especially in the area 
of affordability and accessibility of health care.  
However, the uneven distribution of health care facilities is still a big threat, especially 
to older people in remote areas who are not able to travel far anymore and need these 
institutions close to their homes. Furthermore, more well-educated medical experts are 
needed throughout the PRC to establish support where the traditional caring system is 
getting weaker – a huge financial challenge for the Chinese government in the years to 
come.  
 
Most rural areas don’t have adequate medical facilities. This affects nearly 60 percent of the Chinese 
population. Establishment of adequate public medical facilities is a top agenda item for the Chinese 
government. But the medical facilities in China are primarily operated under a government controlled 
system. Unfortunately the government system cannot bear all the costs of establishing medical 
systems in rural areas.273   
 
Although especially success in the insurance coverage of the population with nearly 100 
percent can be seen today, this system is still out of reach for a large percentage of the 
population due to the limitation of health care for only 25 defined types of major 
illnesses leading to a reimbursement rate of only 60 to 70 percent while the ceiling 
coverage for medical expenses of 60.000 yuan in rural areas is low compared to 
150.000 yuan in urban areas.274 In this respect it was argued that the next five year plan 
from 2011-2015 would lead to even further improvements and resolve outstanding 
problems.275  
 
                                                
271 Chu / Rask 2001: p.2 
272 cf.United Nations Health Partners Group in China 2005 
273 Wang 2011: p.3 
274 cf. Lan 2012  
275 cf. Sullivan / Foster 2012: p.4 
78  
China: Medical Expenses (urban)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Self Insurance Children/family
 
 
China: Medical Expenses (rural)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Self Insurance Children/family
 
Figure 52: China: medical expenses (%) for population aged over 60 (urban/rural) 2000276 
 
What can be seen clearly, however, is the rise in overall annual healthcare expenditures 
in the past decade. Yet compared to other countries China still lags far behind, spending 
just 138.7 USD per capita in 2009 compared to 3,137.8 USD per capita in Japan.277 This 
lack of financial means has a very negative impact on the development of new 
necessary institutions for the ageing Chinese society. Figure 53 shows the growth of 
annual healtcare expenditures that will have to be invested by the Chinese state in the 
years to come.  
 
 
Figure 53: China’s annual health care expenditure 278  
                                                
276 cf. United Nations 2001/2002 
277 KPMG Report 2009 
278 Sullivan / Foster 2012: p.4 
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In conclusion it may be stated that the planned social security reforms were a step 
forward especially after their final formal introduction took place only a few years ago 
as part of the 11th five-year plan in 2009 by the National Development and Reform 
Commission.279 It was further updated in 2011 and these changes will also be 
incorporated into the 12th five-year plan.  
The system is expected by the government to work fully by the year 2020 guaranteeing 
full coverage for all citizens.280 Today, some goals have been accomplished already but 
others, mainly in the sector of full coverage of all age groups and urban as well as rural 
people, are still lagging behind, while the ageing phenomenon will trigger further 
challenges. 
 
Japan 
 
In Japan the shift away from a social security system relying solely on family care 
started in the 1980s when the attitude towards assisting one’s parents during their 
retirement was no longer seen predominantly as an honour but often rather as a burden 
by the caregivers. At the same time co-habitation as well as intergenerational ties were 
weakened.281  
Household separation accompanied by the detachment of work and income can be seen 
as the main reasons for the continuous drop in family support and care described in the 
previous sections.  
The state recognised its need to take responsibility. What complicated the evolvement 
of general social security, though, was the lack of capital for a sudden increase in social 
support. Although the percentage of GDP used to finance the social security system rose 
from 5 percent in 1965 to 12 percent in 1987, the amount is relatively low when 
observing the high percentage of old age people in Japan today.282 The social security 
scheme`s huge deficit led to a reform of the whole system in the 1990s.  
 
Pension and health insurance system reforms were implemented, and the Long-Term Care 
Insurance Act was introduced to address the aging society. Enhancement of childcare services and 
financial support are being promoted to assist child rearing. In addition, due to changes in the 
employment situation and widening difference in economy, employment policies have also become 
important.283 
 
                                                
279 cf. Wang 2011: p.3  
280 cf. Ho 2011: p.2 
281 cf. Ogawa / Retherford 1993: p.585  
282 cf. Ogawa / Rehterford 1993: p.586 et sequ. 
283 Nishimura 2011: p.3  
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Figure 54 shows the steady rise in social security expenditures especially in the area of 
pensions and medical care since the late 1980s. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54: Japan Social Security Benefits Expenditures 1988-2008284 
 
Pension System  
 
In Japan there are two pension schemes — the Employees’ Pension Scheme (EPS) 
launched in 1941 and the National Pension Scheme (NPS) set up in 1961. These two 
schemes cover about 90 percent of the workers while the rest is covered by mutual aid 
association schemes.285 The EPS is mainly used by bigger companies while NPS is 
applied by smaller companies and the self-employed. With EPS the monthly payments 
are split 50-50 between employer and employee, while workers contributing to the NPS 
have to pay the full fee to the government. In 1986 reforms took place and all employed 
now have to be enrolled in the NPS but many participate in another scheme voluntarily.  
Due to the rising number of pensioners and the lack of money to support those who still 
paid a minor amount into the scheme, as well as those to come, the level of 
contributions was questioned and since reforms in 1994 public pension premiums are 
being gradually elevated from 14.5 percent to the target of 29 percent of the wages by 
the year 2025 to meet the higher needs and to make up for inflation and other economic 
factors.286  
 
 
 
                                                
284 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau 
285 cf. Ogawa in Uhlenberg 2009: p.138 
286 cf. MacKellar et al. 2004: p.64 et sequ.   
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Health Care System  
 
Besides pension insurance medical insurance is also becoming more important for the 
older generations. In 1874 Japan introduced the Jyukkyu Kisoku, a law deriving from the 
poor law in England and the social security system in Germany in the time of Bismarck. 
The first social insurance in Japan however was the public health insurance it was 
however only introduced in 1922. 287   
In the first years of its existence, however, it faced various problems and it took until 
1938 when the Ministry of Health and Welfare was established to introduce a National 
Health Insurance (NHI). During the war and post-war eras the system was not reformed 
and remained rather inefficient until the goal of a universal health insurance was set in 
1961. Ever since additional improvements have been made.288  
Today Japan offers two main medical insurance plans, the Employee Health Insurance 
(EHI) and the National Health Insurance (NHI). About 60 percent are enrolled in the 
first, the remaining 40 percent in the second insurance plan as membership is mandatory 
for every citizen.289 However, payments by the population are insufficient and the two 
options must also be subsidised by the government. Additionally, the insured has to pay 
for about 10 percent to 30 percent of the medical costs, which becomes even a greater 
burden when health care expenditures rise due to age. This clearly shows the necessity 
to stabilize the health care system to meet the needs of the future.   
As costs rise, needs are also growing further and financial support by the state cannot be 
guaranteed. The government has to look out for new ways to cope with its changing 
population structure. Family care is often seen as the logical consequence for many 
pensioners who lack the financial support by the state to continue living independently. 
Therefore the Golden Plan was introduced in 1989 for the old and oldest old as a way to 
expand certain facilities such as home helps that would enable family members to care 
for their relatives while still being able to work and earn enough income to pay for the 
family’s expenditures.290  
Following the Golden Plan, the mandatory Long-Term Care Insurance Law (LTCI) was 
introduced in 1997, further adapting to the needs of the elderly. This should give elderly 
and pensioners that meet the eligibility criteria the possibility of social welfare services, 
such as home help services, places at nursing homes, medical services etc. . 
 
                                                
287 cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012 
288 cf. Fukawa 2002: p.4 et sequ.  
289 cf. Squires  2011: p.73 
290 cf. Ihara 2000: p.2 
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There are two types of insured; the first category of insured who are 65+, and the second category of 
insured that is between the age of 40 and 64. The first category of insured is asked to pay a premium 
deducted from pension or direct payment for insurer according to their pension status. In the case of 
the second category of insured, his or her premium is withheld from the medical insurance 
premium.291 
 
Experts see a quite positive move being started by the introduction of the LTCI as the 
number of service providers rose from 95,892 in 2001 to 152,264 in 2005.  At the same 
time, the number of service users rose from 1.49 million in 2000 to 2.39 million in 
2005. Since then the LTCI was reformed in 2005 and in 2011. 292  
Still there is the need for improvement as the quality of support is often criticized 
especially as it is lagging behind compared to family care. Althought various measures 
were introduced to extend the medical safety of the population the number of care 
facilities statistics still show a negative trend.  
There is no question that in the past few years expenditures in relation to national 
income have not risen adequately, and have in relation to overall medical care even 
have been stagnating for the latter elderly. (see figure 55)  
 
 
 
Figure 55: Trends in Medical Care Expenditures 1984-2008293 
 
Regarding this lack of capital, this is where the government has attempted to reach back 
to the traditional value system in trying to get family members more involved and 
shifting the responsibility back to family care. Although Japan is attempting to tackle 
the problem the level of support for the elder has still required elderly support is by far 
not reached today.   
                                                
291 Matsuda 2001: p.5 
292 cf. Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare 2006  
293 cf. Japan Statistic Bureau 
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4. Conclusion   
 
In this paper demographic developments within the past decades in China and in Japan 
were analyzed from various perspectives taking population policies and modernization 
movements that exerted vast influence on these changes into account.   
Following an evaluation of demographic transitions in general, and ageing in particular 
as a main consequence of changes in structure and size of a population, attention was 
focused on the situation of the two East Asian countries, China and Japan.  
Demographic core values such as fertility, mortality and life expectancy were singled 
out to analyse the population trends both countries surpassed in the past decades and to 
offer an insight into their transition.  
 
The results suggest that China as well as Japan have progressed through various stages 
of demographic evolution very rapidly reaching a phase of low birth rates, low death 
rates and an overall declining population. What however needs to be pointed out is, that 
China and Japan both progressed through the stages of demographic development with 
a certain time lag. The analysis reveals that for several decades this time lag can roughly 
be defined as a time span of 20 years, which in countries such as China and Japan, 
where early marriage and motherhood was widespread in the past, can be referred to as 
one generation.  
When looking at the present and into the future this time lag seems to be decreasing 
with China rapidly catching up with Japan. This derives mainly from its recent 
economic growth and its modernization movement and is intensified by its family 
planning mechanisms that were already introduced decades ago and have not been 
mitigated despite the fact that ageing is already perceptible. China and Japan are two 
countries that have experienced the most rapid ageing throughout the world, with China 
being said to age before becoming rich.  
 
Japan completed the demographic transition first in East Asia and is now experiencing the most 
rapidly ageing population among developed economies. […] With the implementation of family-
planning programs, China has undergone demographic transition more rapidly than most industrial 
economies. […] The adjustment of population policies is needed to prevent the Chinese population 
from ageing too rapidly.294 
 
 
 
                                                
294 Cai / Wang 2005: p.4 et sequ.  
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Even tough the historic and economic development and the laws and regulations 
involved during population evolution in China and Japan differed, both countries appear 
to be trapped in a situation of a rapidly ageing society. The fact that people reach a 
higher age is not a negative aspect as such, but the consequences that are involved when 
this extension of life expectancy is related to a huge percentage of a population are 
significant especially when a country is not preparing in time to meet this challenge.  
Analyses show that at present China can be defined as the country with the highest 
number of elderly, while Japan can be seen as the “oldest” state population-wise with 
the highest life expectancy worldwide.  
After the analysis of the past, current and also future demographic transition and the 
comparison of the shifts experienced by the populations, one can draw the conclusion 
that in both countries ageing is already a crucial issue and is becoming a defiance. It is 
going to lead to a broad variety of consequences that may become an even greater threat 
to stability than previously expected.  
This paper drew the attention to the main problems associated with extreme ageing such 
as population decline and dependency ratio, changing living standards and new health 
risks and the inadequate social security and the growing financial burden.   
Without an adequate response one has to be aware of the fact that the consequences of 
these demographic changes can result in a very dangerous situation for the economic 
stability and the wellbeing of the people in both countries. 
 
Having carried out a thorough analysis of population transition and trends in the PRC 
and Japan, Confucian values, that in the past were able to keep a certain social order and 
stability, were used as reference for analysing the extent tradition had and still has on 
the society.   
Taking the analysis in chapter 3.3.1 into account and considering the shift away from a 
traditional support system, Japan is, compared to world-wide statistics for family co-
residence in relation to the extent of ageing a country where one still can find a high 
number of co-residing family members, which “partly reflects the persistence of 
Confucian moral prescriptions about filial obligations to parents. These moral 
prescriptions, which are reinforced by a “shame culture” characterized by deep 
sensitivity to social approval, emphasize descent within stem families” 295 
 
 
 
 
                                                
295 Kending in Ogawa / Retherford 1993: p.588 
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The deeply rooted tradition of filial piety existed for centuries in China [and] despite its erosion in 
recent years, it is implausible that it will disintegrate any time in the near future [...] further, the 
government is making publicized efforts to preserve the traditional values and reinforce the family 
obligations.296  
 
The natural obligation to care, in China as well as in Japan, still seems part of the 
culture and hard to repel which is why state still seems to try to reduce its responsibility 
and thereby its expenditures for elderly care demanding support from the elderly’s 
relatives in the attempt to pass on responsibility making family support unavoidable 
again for the less well-off who cannot afford to pay for private social security. 
The Global Ageing Index China still ranks second in world-wide statistics on the extent 
of family support and Japan ranks third showing the still existing relatively strong 
family ties compared to other countries.297 However the analysis shows that although 
still strong, these networks may not keep up with the speed of ageing and the reduction 
in the percentage of younger generations.  
 
The idea how the old aged expect to live in their retirement time changed too. Recent 
developments appear to lead to future generations that no longer anticipate to be cared 
for by their children but rather resign to the fact that they will have to care for 
themselves working longer and facing the need to keep fit longer. As a consequence it 
becomes evident that more and more pensioners may look after themselves longer than 
in the past as the improved health care keeps them fitter.  One may however not forget 
diseases such as old age dementia, arthritis and other new chronic diseases that will 
render the caring for oneself impossible. Not basic care but specialized help will then be 
needed either in a suitable institution or by educated care attendants.  
Often the best old aged can hope for from their children is intimacy at a distance, which 
is becoming more popular these days among the young adults having parents who no 
longer have the authority they used to have following former traditional patterns. The 
outlook on sporadic visits and humble financial support by the children leads to rising 
rates of saving during working age and investments into private insurances. Many 
people who now already face severe lack of support, such as the childless, realize that 
only the return into employment may save them from indigence. As prices and costs for 
living a decent life as a pensioner are rising, especially due to expenditures for health 
and fitness the pressure on the state and the population is growing.  
 
                                                
296 Chen / Liu 2009: p.170  
297 cf. Global Ageing Index 2010  
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Analyses disclosed that traditional values, deriving mainly from Confucianism 
especially in the area of family care,  are of a very special kind and not comparable to 
those in other countries, it is questionable whether they will remain strong enough and 
therefore be able to mitigate the problems of extreme ageing. In both cases the 
penetration of the society by traditional values seems to still be a vital aspect however it 
is unclear whether they will be able to absorb all the negative consequences deriving 
from the ageing of the whole society.  
During this analysis it became clear that both countries lack the capacities and also the 
regulations to guarantee the support for old age people to create a situation where old 
age people may spend their retirement in dignity and without the danger of ending up in 
extreme poverty. Today already 22 percent of the aged in Japan and 25 percent of the 
elderly in China live in poverty.298  
After a close illustration of the main population shifts in the past and analyzing the main 
factors that make these shifts clear one may state that more responsibility is definitely 
needed on side of the people but especially on side of the government that needs to care 
for its population. The main challenge for both China and Japan will be to establish 
methods of securing the life of the aged so they have the possibility to also enjoy it 
without fearing poverty, illness and abandonement when reaching higher age.  
Although in the past few years small reactions to the ageing problem were felt and new 
laws were launched their success is questionable. While in some areas especially remote 
rural regions in China family care still exists as a mean of secuing old age support, the 
intergenerational support rate is shrinking.  
Japan already experiences a move away from reliable traditional family ties towards a 
life that is depending on the support by a formal support network earlier. Educational 
levels and female activity rate are rising leaving less females with time to support their 
family at home. Especially emotional support is hard to be taken over by strangers, who 
often are poorly trained,  in countries that have for so long been cared for by their 
offspring.  
The sustainability of social security, pension support and health and daily care facilities 
are still in question while main programmes are still in their infancy. One will need to 
try to find an adequate balance between government-provided care and the help that is 
needed from family members to create the best support mechanisms for the elderly.   
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Summarizing this analysis it can be stated that China and Japan with regard to their 
population structure will need to plan ahead and introduce long-term solutions as soon 
as possible, as demographic transition is continuing and ageing is very rapidly 
becoming a core problem of society. Negative impacts are already felt today; while at 
the moment they are still more severe in Japan than in China, the PRC is expected to 
catch up soon. 
China and Japan still belong to the top 3 countries when it comes to the strength of their 
family ties, however it is expected that family structures will continue to change in the 
decades to come which will reduce the availability of informal social networks to care 
for the high percentage of elderly. A tight social security network that may absorb 
newly arising tensions and that is flexible enough to react to sudden changes is needed. 
The earlier one reacts to the new burdens population ageing will create, the easier it will 
be to get along with this new demographic reality.  
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Der Demographiche Übergang und Alterung 
in China und Japan 
 
Traditionelle Werte und Moderner Lebensstil  
 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG  
 
Gesellschaften auf der ganzen Welt unterliegen vielerlei Veränderungen, vor allem in 
Bezug auf ihre demographische Zusammensetzung. Die Analyse des demographischen 
Wandels wird zunehmend bedeutsamer, da eine große Anzahl an Implikationen mit 
diesem verbunden sind.  
Vor allem die Demographie der Länder Ostasiens entwickeln sich sehr rasch und so 
werden diese sich mit vielerlei neuen Herausforderungen konfrontiert sehen, von 
welchen eine der gravierendsten die Alterung sein wird.  
Diese Masterarbeit wird im Zuge einer komparativen Analyse der Länder China und 
Japan, welche schon einige Phasen der demographischen Entwicklung passiert haben 
und zu einer dynamischen Region wurden, die historische demographische Entwicklung 
und die Faktoren, die mit dieser raschen Veränderungen der Bevölkerung einhergehen, 
untersuchen. Es ist von großer Bedeutung den Einfluss der 
Bevölkerungsplanungsmechanismen und des wirtschaftlichen Aufschwungs auf die 
Bevölkerungsentwicklung in der Region zu untersuchen, um einen Vergleich zu 
ermöglichen. China und Japan zählen zu den Ländern, deren Bevölkerung heute schon 
von einem sehr hohen Prozentsatz an Pensionisten dominiert wird. Diese rasche 
Alterung wird unter dem Aspekt einer steigenden Abhängigkeitsrate, veränderter 
Lebensstandards, neuer Gesundheitsrisiken,  neuer Herausforderungen für die soziale 
Absicherung und demzufolge fehlenden  finanziellen Mitteln für die Altersversorgung 
analysiert werden. Darüber hinaus werden traditionelle Werte, vor allem jene des 
Konfuzianismus und deren früherer und gegenwärtiger Einfluss auf Familienformen, 
Lebenssituation und informelle Pflege durch Familienangehörige untersucht, um 
herauszufinden, welche Möglichkeiten zur Abschwächung der Herauforderung einer 
rasch alternden Gesellschaft vorhanden sind. 
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Demographic Transition and Ageing 
in China and Japan  
 
Traditional Values and Modern Lifestyle  
ABSTRACT  
 
World populations are on the move and demographic transformation has become an 
important issue with astonishing implications on the development of entire countries 
and regions. Especially in East Asia countries are moving forward in terms of their 
development and will have to face new challenges that evolve due to their demographic 
transition, one of the most defying being the ageing phenomenon.  
 
This paper investigates the historic demographic transition and the different factors that 
have influenced the rapid population changes of China and Japan, two countries that 
have already passed various stages of the demographic transition and became a very 
dynamic region. The population planning methods and policies and the influence of 
economic growth on the society will be examined and compared to evaluate the 
magnitude of their influence on population developments.  
China and Japan as two countries that are already facing heavy ageing will be analyzed 
with regard to the main challenges of population decline, a changing dependency ration, 
living standards, new health risks, social security and the financial burden of an 
increasing percentage of pensioners. The traditional values, especially those of 
Confucianism, which have a considerable impact on family patterns, living 
arrangements and informal care for the elderly, will be under study to work out their 
influence on society and their possibilities to mitigate the defiances resulting from the 
rapidly ageing population. 
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